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THE NORMATIVITY OF COPYING IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH†
ABSTRACT
Not all copying constitutes copyright infringement. Quite
independent of fair use, copyright law requires that an act of copying
be qualitatively and quantitatively significant enoughor
“substantially similar”for it to be actionable. Originating in the
nineteenth century, and entirely the creation of courts, copyright’s
requirement of “substantial similarity” has thus far received little
attention as an independently meaningful normative dimension of the
copyright entitlement. This Article offers a novel theory for
copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement by placing it firmly at
the center of the institution and its various goals and purposes. As a
common-law-style device that mirrors the functioning of other areas
of private law, such as tort law, substantial similarity remains an
unappreciated source of flexibility and pluralism in copyright law. It
allows courts to modulate the copyright entitlement’s operational
robustness by altering the amount of exclusivity that a work obtains,
based on different criteria, and thereby introduces “thickness” as an
altogether new dimension of the entitlement. It also renders the
adjudication of copyright infringement overtly pluralistic by
sequencing the introduction of incommensurable values into the
inquiry in a particular, reasoned order. As a mechanism of conceptual
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sequencing—a multicriterion decision-making process long known to
the common law—substantial similarity allows copyright law to
affirm both utilitarian and personality-based considerations, while
prioritizing the former over the latter systemically. Viewing copyright
law through the lens of substantial similarity sheds new light on the
compatibility of the institution’s goals and purposes, copyright’s
structure as a “property” right, and the role of courts within its overall
scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
In their exuberance to describe copyright as a form of
intellectual “property,” courts and scholars all too easily ignore what
is perhaps copyright law’s singular identifying structural attribute: its
1
emphasis on copying. Dating back to its origins, copyright law has
operated principally by granting its holder the exclusive right to copy
a creative work of authorship, and actions for copyright infringement
2
have ever since revolved entirely around a showing of copying.
Although the scope of what copying entails and extends
todistribution, performance, adaptation, and the likehas no
doubt expanded over time, it remains equally true that copying, in
3
one form or another, remains the true sine qua non of copyright law.
Perhaps more importantly, to the extent that copyright law’s
emphasis on copying is ever analyzed and compared to other
intellectual property regimes, it is done so in its evidentiary, or
4
probative, dimension. Proof of copying is really thought to represent
5
the extent of the institution’s engagement with the idea of copying.

1. For an extensive discussion of the propertarian turn in copyright law, identifying its
causes and effects, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 154–68 (2008);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1132–42
(2009).
2. For an early instantiation of this idea in the first copyright statute, see An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.), which granted authors the sole right
and liberty of “printing” written work. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124,
(amended).
3. Nimmer on Copyright, MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT (2012), describes the “copying” requirement as both an extrinsic and intrinsic
limitation on the rights of the copyright owner, see 2 id. § 8.01[A] (“[A]bsent copying, there can
be no infringement of copyright.” (footnote omitted)); see also William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344 (1989)
(recognizing the fact that “copyright merely gives protection against copying” as a principal
feature of copyright law).
4. For the leading account in this area, see generally Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity”
as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1187 (1990). Professor Latman’s point was that this focus on copying as a purely probative
inquiry was misplaced and obscured the reality that the question of copying had important
additional dimensions. Id. at 1189–90.
5. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 480–82 (2006); Michael K. Erickson, Comment, Emphasizing the Copy
in Copyright: Why Noncopying Alterations Do Not Prepare Infringing Derivative Works, 2005
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1261, 1297. The literature trying to understand the copyright-patent divergence
in terms of information costs also focuses primarily on the probative dimension of copyright’s
copying requirement and its independent-creation defense. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs
in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 526 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property
as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1810 (2007).
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What this view inevitably ignores is the fact that copyright law’s
emphasis on copying has a large, underappreciated normative
dimension to it, one that derives from copyright law’s somewhat
counterintuitive recognition that “not all copying, however, is
6
copyright infringement.” Importantly, this normative question bears
no connection whatsoever to the fair-use doctrine, a doctrine which
operates as a defense to infringement rather than as a component of
7
the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Instead, it comes into playat least in
theoryin every single judicial determination of copyright
8
infringement, through the requirement of “substantial similarity.”
In a copyright-infringement suit, the plaintiff is required to prove
9
that the defendant “copied” the protected work. Although this
burden of proof has a clear factual element to it, that is, whether the
10
defendant had access to the work and actually copied it, it entails
much more. Copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement steps in
here. Substantial similarity is a judicially created rule that places the
burden to establish that the defendant’s copying is actionable as a
legal proposition on the plaintiff in a copyright-infringement suit,
11
even when the copying is shown to exist as a factual matter. The
defendant’s copying thus must be shown to be improper or wrongful
12
in order to be actionable. The substantial-similarity analysis has
courts focus entirely on the significance of the similarity between the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works for their assessment of
13
actionability. Unsurprisingly, this inquiry inevitably entails the
conscious introduction of a large normative/evaluative dimension into
the analysis of the entitlement. The more quantitatively and
qualitatively significant the borrowing by the defendant, the more
likely it is that the copying will be considered improper, and hence
14
actionable. This Article advances a theory of copyright’s analytical
structure that places its emphasis on copying—as a normative
matter—at the center of the institution.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05.
Id. § 13.01[B].
Id.
See id. § 13.02[A] (discussing the access requirement).
Id. § 13.03[A].
Id. § 13.01[B].
ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN
COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1 (2010).
14. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[A].
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Copyright law’s analysis of copying is usually carried out in two
15
distinct steps. In the first step, the court examines the plaintiff’s
work, determines what parts of it are eligible for copyright protection
16
(a process referred to as “dissection” ), and looks to the defendant’s
work to see if the protected parts were indeed copied. This step is
often referred to as the step of “probative similarity,” or as the
“extrinsic test,” and the focus here is entirely on whether the
defendant copied protected material from the plaintiff’s work as a
17
factual matter. Very importantly, at the conclusion of this step, and
based on its examination of the plaintiff’s work, the court fixes the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied during its assessment of the
actionability of the defendant’s copying. Here the court effectively
determines the thickness of protection to which the work is entitled
18
under copyright law. Thickness operates as a direct measure of the
copyright entitlement’s exclusionary robustness. The thicker the
entitlement, the greater the forms and types of copying that are likely
to be actionable; conversely, the thinner the entitlement, the fewer
the forms and types of copying that are considered actionable.

15. See Ringgold v. BET, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing two different steps:
“proof of copying” and “determining that the degree of similarity suffices to demonstrate
actionable infringement”); OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1; Mark A. Lemley,
Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement (pt. 1), 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
719, 721–23 (2010).
16. E.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
17. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing the “extrinsic test” as a test that “depends not on the responses
of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed”), superseded on
other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, ch. 5, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); Latman, supra note 4, at 1204
(describing “probative similarity” as focusing on “facts probative of copying”).
18. It is worth noting that courts do not generally use the term “thickness” themselves.
They nonetheless do routinely describe an entitlement as “thin.” E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 616 F.3d 904,
914 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts also occasionally refer to entitlements as “thick.” See Fleener v.
Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“[Books] are accorded
‘thick’ copyright protection.”). For early identifiable scholarly uses of “thickness” as a variable
in light of these usages by courts, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the
Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 859 n.42, 884–87
(2004); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008); Eric Setliff,
Copyright and Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
49, 77 (2006).

BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

208

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/29/2012 10:51 AM

[Vol. 62:203

Thickness thus sets the requisite level of similarity that needs to be
19
found for the copying to be deemed actionable.
In the second step, referred to as the substantial-similarity
analysis, the court applies the level of scrutiny, i.e., thickness, so
chosen to its analysis of the two works—the original and the
defendant’s copy—to determine whether the copying does indeed rise
20
to the level of an infringement. Although no doubt a factual
determination, this step operates as a subjective evaluation of the
different parts of the two works and of their relative contributions to
the overall significance of the work, both as a quantitative and
qualitative matter, in order to assess whether the copying amounted
21
to a “wrong.” It is carried out using the level of scrutiny chosen by
the court for the work at the end of the first step.
As should be apparent, even though the determination of the
entitlement’s thickness technically occurs prior to the substantialsimilarity analysis, the former informs the latter in large measure. The
substantial-similarity inquiry thus in reality involves two elements of
its own: the thickness determination, and the similarity analysis. The
similarity analysis operates as a comparison of the two works, while
the thickness analysis determines how substantial the similarity needs
to be during the comparison. Disaggregating copyright law’s analysis
of substantial similarity in this manner reveals the process to be an
unappreciated source of structural and substantive nuance in
copyright law.
First, it introduces a good deal of flexibility into the copyright
entitlement. By allowing the court to set the appropriate level of
“thickness” of the entitlement for each protected work on a case-bycase basis, it injects a large amount of flexibility and context-sensitive
tailoring into copyright’s adjudication process. Copyright law has long
been thought to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to creativity by
offering creative expression exclusionary protection for the same
amount of time and through the same or at best, similar, bundle of
22
exclusive rights. Focusing on thickness reveals that this is only half of
the story, because courts inject an altogether new dimension into the

19. For a further explanation of thickness, see infra Part I.B.
20. See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (“If copying is established, then only does there arise
the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation).”).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 875 (2006).
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entitlement-delineation process in traditional common-law fashion;
indeed, a dimension that copyright’s extensive reliance on real23
property analogies fails to capture altogether. Contrary to common
belief then, courts thus play a central role in framing and delineating
the copyright entitlement.
Second, it also converts copyright adjudication into a
multicriterial decision-making process by allowing incommensurable,
plural values to inform the analysis sequentially. As noted previously,
the substantial-similarity analysis enables the introduction of a large
normative component into the infringement inquiryboth in the
choice of framework for scrutiny, and in the actual application of that
framework to the works being compared. In determining the
“thickness” of the copyright entitlement—that is, the level of scrutiny
to be applied in the analysis—courts actively examine the creative
work through the rubric of copyright’s overall utilitarian goals and
purposes, as manifested in numerous internal devices. Thus, the more
creative, original, or expressive the work, the thicker the copyright
24
entitlement over it. Indeed, this process of connecting the thickness
of the entitlement to the institution’s overall utilitarian goals received
the direct approbation of the Supreme Court two decades ago. In
25
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., a decision
best known for its analysis of copyright’s originality requirement, the
Court expressly noted that works that served copyright’s primary
purpose only marginally should obtain no more than “thin”
26
protection. Conversely, by implication, works that furthered this
central purpose more directly, such as highly original or creative
works, were to obtain thicker protection. The thickness prong of the

23. For a discussion of copyright’s extensive use of real-property analogies and its effect on
the doctrine, see Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1138.
24. To be sure, no court has looked beyond originality and functionality as the variables
that dictate the thickness analysis. But there seems to be little reason for courts to limit
themselves in this manner. See generally Dale P. Olson, Thin Copyrights, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 147,
147–48 (1992) (describing the Feist decision and speculating that it will result in the
development of a “thin” copyright doctrine, based entirely on a work’s originality). For recent
work arguing that courts should extend the idea to an analysis of a creator’s economic motives,
see Loren, supra note 18, at 36, which argues that “[c]ourts should expand their inquiry and
consider the primary motivation for the creation and distribution of the type of work at issue as
relevant to the degree of similarity required in order to infringe a particular work.”
25. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
26. Id. at 349. For other courts’ use of the term “thin,” see Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805,
812 (9th Cir. 2003); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
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analysis thus allows the entitlement to be calibrated to copyright’s
utilitarian values in direct, scalar terms.
In applying the standard of scrutiny chosen and assessing the
similarity of the two works, the analysis then has courts examine
whether the defendant’s copying took elements of “essence” and
27
“value” from the work —in effect asking whether the copying
extended to parts of the work that were likely most meaningful to its
creator. As should be apparent, this inquiry begins to resemble an
inquiry into the connection between the creator and the work,
reminiscent of personality-based, or droit d’auteur, deontic interests
28
in copyright law. What is most interesting, though, is that the two
stages operate independently, yet in an ordered sequence—which
allows the two values, that is, utilitarian and personality-based ones,
29
to enter the picture without having to be traded off directly.
Far from representing an ad hoc process then, the two-staged
substantial-similarity analysis is a mechanism that allows copyright
law to accommodate otherwise conflicting values into its functioning.
American copyright law has long prided itself on being wedded to an
avowedly utilitarian theory of providing creators with efficient
30
market-based incentives to create. Personhood-based or analogous
deontic theories—which focus on the connection between creator and
work and the nonutilitarian motivations for creativity—are thought to
be of little-to-no significance in the overall functioning of the system,
largely because they are thought of as incapable of coexisting with the
31
institution’s utilitarian focus. A closer scrutiny of substantial
similarity tells us that this may not be the case after all.
Indeed, the problem of incommensurability that lies at the heart
of the utilitarian-deontic divide in copyright law can be understood as

27. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 3, § 13.03[A][1] (describing comprehensive nonliteral similarity as examining whether the
“fundamental essence” was duplicated).
28. See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (1978); Rudolf Monta, The
Concept of “Copyright” Versus the “Droit D’Auteur,” 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 178 (1959) (“For
the French the droit d’auteur is the most personal of all properties because it is the creation of
the mind, and this droit d’auteur has its origin and justification in the very fact of the intellectual
creation.”).
29. See infra Part II.
30. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990); Monta, supra note 28, at 185.
31. See Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 992.
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an instance of the “voting paradox,” first identified by Condorcet
and made famous by Professor Kenneth Arrow in developing his
33
theory of social choice. In his Nobel Prize-winning work, Arrow
showed that it is impossible to design a coherent system of
aggregating the votes of multiple individuals that respects their
34
unanimous preferences. Arrow’s “impossibility theorem” came in
due course to be applied to other types of decision making that
sought to synthesize multiple criteria into a single decision—when the
same problem with synthesizing the preferences of individual voters
presented itself in identical fashion, as well as when individual voters
35
were simply replaced by independent criteria.
One such
fundamental problem was that the introduction of a new criterion for
the decision altered people’s preferences, producing an intransitivity
36
in the ordering. The problem of synthesizing copyright’s utilitarian
objectives and individual personality-based ones into a single
outcome can be understood as presenting the same kind of paradox
as that seen in social-choice contexts. A decision to protect based
exclusively on utilitarian considerations could pull in one direction,
while one based on personality criteria might pull in the opposite
direction.
Consider the following example: da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is an
extremely original, creative, and expressive work of art. Measured in
purely utilitarian terms, it is precisely the kind of work the copyright
system would want to encourage, and therefore merits the widest
37
possible protection available. The essence and genius of da Vinci’s
work in Mona Lisa is thought to lie in its depiction of the model, and

32. See JEAN-ANTOINE-NICOLAS CARITAT DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR L’APPLICATION
À LA PROBABILIT´E DES D´ECISIONS RENDUES À LA PLURALIT´E DES VOIX
(1785).
33. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 93 (1963).
34. Id. at 96–103; LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 5–7 (2011).
35. See KENNETH ARROW & HERVÉ RAYNAUD, SOCIAL CHOICE AND MULTICRITERION
DECISION-MAKING 18–23 (1986).
36. For a demonstration of the idea, see Reinold H. Van Til, Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem, 126 DE ECONOMIST 84, 93–96 (1978). In social-choice theory, this is referred to as the
axiom of the “independence of irrelevant alternatives.” See Paramesh Ray, Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives, 41 ECONOMETRICA 987 (1973).
37. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (holding that a
factual compilation, with little original expression, would receive the thinnest copyright
protection).
DE L’ANALYSE
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her facial and bodily features in overtly subtle fashion. Now assume
that another artist, Salvador Dalí, creates a portrait, but of a
completely different person—say himself—with completely different
facial and bodily features. Yet his final portrait, which he titles Self
Portrait as Mona Lisa, copies some of the background hills from the
Mona Lisa. Assuming that copyright in da Vinci’s work hadn’t
already expired, from a personality point of view we would argue that
Dalí’s artwork doesn’t infringe on da Vinci’s, because it didn’t copy
parts of the Mona Lisa that da Vinci can be said to have invested his
39
creative personality into. The problem now becomes one of
reconciling copyright’s commitment to its utilitarian criteria, which
would favor da Vinci—and find liability—with the personality ideal,
which would favor Dalí—and find no liability.
To solve similar problems of incommensurability that flow from
multicriterion decision making in other parts of the common law,
scholars have relied on a mechanism known as “conceptual
sequencing,” in which plural and incommensurable values are
40
admitted into the calculus in a temporally ordered sequence. Instead
of requiring the decision maker to weigh and balance them against
each other, or to choose some criteria over others, it enables the
decision maker to accord different values varying but nonnegligible
importance in the overall calculus, based on the order in which they
are considered during the adjudication. It partitions the inquiry into
multiple steps based on the independent criteria in question,
prioritizes the steps to reflect the relative importance of the criteria,
and forces decision making to follow the order, thereby cabining the
considerations at each stage. In the process, the final entitlement
comes to derive from multiple values and tends to vary contextually
41
to reflect this reality.
The two elements of substantial similarity can be understood as
copyright law’s multicriterial mechanism of conceptual sequencing.
38. See generally Bruno Mottin, Reading the Image, in JEAN-PIERRE MOHEN ET AL.,
MONA LISA: INSIDE THE PAINTING 64, 70 (2006) (cataloguing minute details of the model that
“vibrate in the light and quiver at the slightest breath of wind”).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. For prominent examples, see Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and
Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1998), which analogizes
conceptual sequencing in the law to a committee ordering certain values when selecting students
for academic scholarships, and Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 621, 625 (2002), which argues that the separate values of deterrence and corrective
justice in tort law can be reconciled through conceptual sequencing.
41. Chapman, supra note 40, at 1496–1507.
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The thickness step has courts evaluate the abstract entitlement
exclusively in rule-utilitarian terms, while the similarity determination
allows courts to consider only interpersonal deontic considerations.
The substantial-similarity sequence can thus be appreciated as
copyright law’s attempt to deal with the paradox of inconsistent
preferences across different criteria, which lies at the heart of socialchoice theory. Going back to our hypothetical then, it would allow a
court to accord da Vinci the thickest possible protection at first and in
the abstract, and then in the next step find that Dalí’s copying is not
similar enough to merit liability.
Copyright’s substantial-similarity analysis has long troubled
courts and scholars. Although many have argued for its modification,
retrenchment, and even wholesale abandonment, few have discerned
42
any logic in its working. Understanding it in terms of social-choice
theory and in terms of the paradox of incommensurability that
accompanies multicriterial decision making, allows us to make perfect
sense of a part of copyright law that has long been deemed an
impenetrable jungle. This Article thus develops a theory of
substantial similarity in copyright law that is both positive and
normative. Premised on the idea that copyright law can indeed learn
from the mechanisms and processes of decision making that have long
been employed in different common-law contexts in which plural and
often conflicting values have long coexisted through techniques of
43
judicial reasoning, this Article argues for a more ambitious,
constructive role for copyright’s substantial-similarity inquiry.
Part I begins with the descriptive. It starts by unpacking the idea
of substantial similarity. Part I.A first examines how courts use
substantial similarity as a largely normative inquiry under which they
assess the wrongfulness of a defendant’s copying. Part I.B then sets
out different formulations of substantial similarity that vary in
stringency, that is, the idea of thickness. Part I.C describes the
alteration in the criteria that thickness entails, and Part I.D finally
analyzes the flexibility that this process affords courts in tailoring
copyright’s entitlement structure. This Part makes the claim that the
substantial-similarity inquiry represents an important structural
42. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 15, at 719 (arguing for retrenchment of substantial
similarity); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 683, 738–40 (2012) (arguing for its abolition).
43. For an elaboration of this argument in the context of state intellectual-property
regimes, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1550 (2010).
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dimension of the copyright entitlement, and that despite its seemingly
confusing nature, it remains analytically and normatively rich, a
feature that allows courts to inject a meaningful degree of variability
into crafting copyright’s individual entitlement.
Part II then focuses on how the substantial-similarity inquiry,
when meaningfully employed, can serve to mediate plural values
within copyright law. The argument here moves from the descriptive
to the normative. Part II.A begins by setting out the ideas of
“conceptual sequencing” and “defeasible” rules that have long been
employed in numerous areas of the common law as mechanisms of
pluralistic adjudication. Part II.B, by describing how different kinds of
valuesutilitarian and rights basedcan be allowed into the calculus
at different stages of the inquiry, shows how the substantial-similarity
analysis ought to be understood as a mechanism of conceptual
sequencing.
Part III then sets out some of the important structural and
functional advantages that are likely to flow from viewing substantial
similarity as a mechanism of conceptually sequencing
incommensurable values in copyright law, including its ability to
prioritize utilitarian values over deontic ones, its bifurcation of
upstream and downstream guidance, its likely injection of added
clarity and candor into copyright decision making, and perhaps most
importantly, the likelihood that it will indirectly result in a more
coherent framework for the fair-use doctrine. Part IV then illustrates
how courts might apply the analysis in practice, using a landmark
copyright decision that has for decades received sustained criticism
from scholars for its sloppy reasoning: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
44
v. Nation Enterprises. Analyzing the case through the framework of
substantial similarity reveals that even if the Court’s final decision
had remained the same, its use of substantial similarity might have
rendered its reasoning more defensible.
I. “SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY” IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Discussions of copyright’s structural dimensions very often
45
ignore the reality that copyright law is essentially about copying.
Unlike patent law, which treats a defendant’s mere use of a protected
invention as an act of patent infringement, copyright infringement is

44. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005).
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predicated on a defendant’s act of copying. Yet copying, or the act of
appropriation that copyright law cares about, is both factual and
normative. On the one hand, copyright law looks for the existence of
“actual copying,” borne out by a defendant’s access to the protected
47
work and other circumstantial evidence. Beyond that, however,
copyright law also insists that the copying so proven to exist be shown
48
to be “improper,” “unlawful,” “illicit,” or “wrongful.” As a
normative inquiry, copyright’s doctrinal device for establishing
wrongful copying is the idea of “substantial similarity.”
Copyright law’s requirement of substantial similarity is in many
ways more open-ended than the fair-use doctrine. Unlike fair use,
49
which today finds mention in the Copyright Act of 1976, substantial
similarity continues to remain a doctrine that is policed, enforced, and
50
molded entirely by courts. In this respect it is perhaps more
common-law-like than fair use, with courts often finding themselves
completely free to adapt the doctrine to new contexts and
51
technological developments. While many continue to criticize its
intrinsic open-endedness, little consideration has been paid to the
virtues that this flexibility might afford courts in shaping the
52
structural and substantive dimensions of the copyright entitlement.
This Part describes the substantial-similarity inquiry, situating it
within the common-law tradition internal to copyright adjudication.
Part I.A begins by setting out what copyright’s substantial-similarity
inquiry is and the different steps that it entails. Part I.B goes on to
show how courts have over the years come to employ its openendedness to effectively create a new dimension to the copyright
46. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 126, 475–76 (4th rev. ed. 2007).
47. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.02[A].
48. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467–73 (2d Cir. 1946); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 3, § 13.03[A].
49. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
50. See id. § 107 (2006) (codifying fair use).
51. For an extension to the context of computer software, see Computer Associates
International Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992), which developed the wellknown “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test, id.
52. For criticisms of substantial similarity’s open-endedness, see generally Amy B. Cohen,
Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987); Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial
Similarity Down to Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181 (1993); Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward a Better
Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971
(2000).
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entitlement, measured by the amount of exclusivity a work is
granted—the rubric of “thickness”—which they use to set the
standard of scrutiny to be employed in their analysis of the similarity
between the works. Part I.C then analyzes how courts operationalize
the thickness they choose during their actual comparison of the
works, which constitutes their examination of the wrongfulness of the
defendant’s copying. Finally, Part I.D explores the underappreciated
opportunity that the substantial-similarity inquiry gives courts to
minimize copyright law’s uniformity costs.
A. Disaggregating “Copying”
Going beyond proof of copying, the requirement of substantial
similarity has courts ask whether a defendant’s copying is
53
quantitatively and qualitatively “enough” to be rendered actionable.
Its origins can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, around
the same time when the fair-use doctrine began to take shape.
Around this time, courts in copyright cases began examining the
extent, “value,” and qualitative significance of what the defendant
had copied from a protected work as part of their infringement
54
analysis. The copying thus had to be substantial, in the sense that it
related to what was qualitatively significant in the plaintiff’s work.
It wasn’t until the early twentieth century, however, that courts
came to acknowledge its independent role in the infringement
analysis. This process began with the Second Circuit recognizing that
the test for infringement necessarily involved a subjective, context55
specific inquiry that was vague rather than mechanistic. It thus
entailed confronting the question of when and under what
circumstances a defendant’s copying ought to be considered
56
problematic, and whether the copying was “substantial.” In Arnstein
57
v. Porter, the court formally affirmed this reality when it bifurcated
58
the question of copying into two independent steps. In the first, the
court is to assess the similarities between the works in order to draw
59
an inference of actual copying. Occasionally referred to as the
53. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1.
54. See, e.g., Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
55. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
56. Id. at 121.
57. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
58. Id. at 468.
59. Id.
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question of “probative similarity,” this relates largely to the question
60
of copying as a factual matter. In the second step, the court is to
determine if the copying so shown to exist is itself “improper,”
61
“unlawful,” or “illicit.” Although both steps are structured as factual
inquiries, the second step involves the court determining whether an
ordinary observer of the two works would deem the appropriation
62
“wrongful.” All the same, the basis of this wrongfulness remains
largely subjective, even though it is connected to the works
themselves.
The bifurcation that the court set out in Arnstein is far from
simple. To prove actual copying via probative similarity, the court’s
test involves looking for the existence of access (on the part of the
defendant to the protected work) and actual similarities between the
63
protectible parts of the two works. In this latter part of the test, often
referred to as the process of “dissection,” courts are permitted to
make use of experts in a given area of creativity to detect patterns of
similarity and difference between the works and to assess what parts
64
are original to either. After this part of the test is satisfied and the
court concludes that there was indeed copying of protected material,
it moves on to the question of unlawful copying, or substantial
65
similarity. Yet, here the Arnstein test does not allow a court to make
66
use of expert testimony. The court is instead to put itself in the
67
position of an ordinary observer. In applying the ordinary-observer
test, a court usually undertakes an assessment of the overall similarity
between the two works, rather than a component-by-component
68
comparison. It examines the “quantity” and “quality” of what the
defendant’s work appropriated from the plaintiff’s as part of this

60. The term “probative similarity” was coined by Professor Alan Latman. Latman, supra
note 4, at 1189–90.
61. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1.
62. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (“The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from
plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”).
63. Id. at 468.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. For a recent criticism of this variation, arguing that substantial similarity should be
tried to a jury instead of being evaluated by experts, see generally Lemley, supra note 15.
67. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
68. See, e.g., Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1986).
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69

Although the quantitative aspect is fairly
examination.
straightforward, on the qualitative side the test has the court examine
whether the defendant’s copying took material of essence and value
70
from a plaintiff’s work. The logic behind this approach to the
qualitative element is thought to lie in copyright’s avowed goal of
71
protecting a creator’s value in the work. Focusing on the
preservation of this value is thus allowed to inform the question of
substantiality. Essence and value are of course subjective indicators,
which in turn allow the test to vary from one setting to another, and
which, in the absence of expert testimony, can result in
determinations that a court considers to be intuitively correct.
Three decades after the formulation of the Arnstein test by the
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit modified the test into its own two72
stage approach. In this variation, step one entails the court merely
examining whether there exists any similarity between the ideas
underlying the two works. Referred to as the “extrinsic test,” here
too, the process allows for the use of expert testimony and analytic
73
dissection. In the second step, the “intrinsic” one, the court gets to
the question of substantial similarity by examining the similarity in
expression between the two works, and it asks whether the total
74
concept and feel of the two works are substantially similar. Here,
much like the Arnstein test, the court is to adopt the standard of an
“ordinary reasonable person” and eschew any reliance on outside
75
testimony or analytic dissection. Most courts across the country
76
follow one of these two approaches.
It is worth reiterating that neither of these approaches is
particularly straightforward. Numerous courts, regardless of which
approach they have adopted, have routinely conflated the two steps

69. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (“[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort,
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.”).
70. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2.4.
71. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).
72. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977) superseded on other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, ch. 5,
§ 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1167.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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of the inquiryunder the singular rubric of “substantial
similarity”and in the process elided the all-important distinction
77
between “actual” and “improper” copying.
In applying the second part of either test, courts tend to fluctuate
in determining who the “ordinary” person is—the hypothetical
individual through whose eyes the analysis is to be carried out. One
approach adopts a layperson standard, seemingly agnostic to any
78
purpose underlying the formulation. Another approach treats the
79
ordinary person as a member of the “intended audience.” In general,
courts following the extrinsic-intrinsic approach to substantial
similarity follow an intended-audience approach, whereas those
adhering to the traditional Arnstein formulation use a layperson
80
standard.
The logic for using an intended-audience approach in
determining who the ordinary observer is derives from the belief that
copyright’s primary purpose lies in preventing copying only when it
results in the creation of close substitutes that are in turn likely to
81
divert demand away from the original. The intended audience is
thought to represent the threshold for such substitutability and
diversion, and courts thus use it to evaluate the possibility of
economic harm. Indeed, some courts have expressly stated as much in
explaining their preference for an intended-audience approach over a
82
layperson one. Although some have commended the intended77. See, e.g., Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing
substantial similarity); Murray Hill Publ’ns v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312,
316–21 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587–88 (2d Cir. 1996) (same);
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); see also Latman,
supra note 4, at 1189–91 (same); Lemley, supra note 15, at 720–22 (discussing improper and
illicit appropriation).
78. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 722–26 (providing examples of the “ordinary observer”
test).
79. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:2.2[A] (describing a test that
“seek[s] to gauge the reaction of the intended audience of the works” rather than that of any lay
observer); Lemley, supra note 15, at 729–30.
80. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 724–26 (explaining how different circuit courts approach
the issue); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (describing the layperson
standard).
81. See Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright
Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 144–45 (1988) (“If, as Arnstein suggested,
copyright law should protect the plaintiff’s interest in potential financial returns, the ultimate
test for infringement should consider specifically the response of the market from which those
returns would derive.”).
82. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733–34 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In light of the
copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s market, we think it sensible to embrace
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audience approach for its avowed attempt to connect substantial
similarity to copyright’s underlying market-based justification, the
approach eliminates from the inquiry other variables that might go
into a more holistic assessment of the impropriety or unlawfulness of
83
the defendant’s copying. The value of a work to the copyright holder
might, for instance, be diminished by the creation of complementary,
84
rather than substitutive, copies in certain instances. In this situation,
it is unlikely that a focus on the narrow market for the protected work
is likely to adequately capture the concerns at stake.
All the same, adopting an intended-audience approach instead of
the default ordinary-observer one does not seem to actually alter the
underlying content of the inquiry in any significant manner. Courts
have said surprisingly little about the factors that are meant to go into
a fact finder’s individualized assessment of whether the similarity is
substantial. Any discussion of the actual standard by courts tends to
be framed in largely prudential language. Courts thus emphasize the
following: that the standard is meant “to gauge the reaction of the
85
ordinary ‘man on the street’ to the two works”; that the test is the
86
“overall similarities” between the two works; that it is to entail an
examination of both “quantitative” and “qualitative” elements; that a
decision maker is to consider factors such as the amount of creativity
and originality involved, in addition to the nature of the protected
87
material and the setting in which it appears; and that the reaction of
the ordinary observer being considered should be “spontaneous” and
88
“immediate.” It is not readily apparent that these observations do
much to focus the actual determination. Other than pointing to the
reality that the determination is to derive primarily from a
comparison of the works themselves and is to be carried out in a
nonmechanical fashion, these observations seem to add very little
when viewed in the abstract.

Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be oriented toward the
works’ intended audience.”).
83. See Lape, supra note 52, at 198–99. For a criticism of this approach, suggesting its
incompatibility with the Supreme Court’s observations in Feist, see 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 3, § 13.03[E][1][a].
84. For more on this, see infra Part II.B.2.
85. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1[A].
86. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988)
(quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
87. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999).
88. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001).
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To sum up then, copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement
does not merely entail a comparison of the two works to find the
existence of actual copying. It involves a large normative component
in which courts are to judge the wrongfulness of a defendant’s act of
copying, once shown to exist. Although this wrongfulness is filtered
through a comparison of the works themselves, the variables that
influence it remain subjective and couched in terms of a layperson or
ordinary-observer standard. Copying is thought to be actionable
under the requirement only when it reaches certain quantitative and
qualitative thresholds; yet, the bases for those thresholds remains
fairly diverse, allowing courts to infuse these thresholds with largely
intuitive notions of when an appropriation is to be considered
wrongful and therefore actionable.
B. An Intermediate Step: The Idea of “Thickness”
Substantial similarity thus operates as an evaluation of the
defendant’s copying, which a court or fact finder uses to assess the
wrongfulness of the copying and, consequently, its actionability. The
ordinary-observer standard operates along the lines of tort law’s
reasonable-person requirement, creating a legal fiction through which
89
the wrongfulness of the action in question is assessed. Yet the
requirement’s complexity does not end there. Courts have come to
develop a few well-known variations of the doctrine in an effort to
account for the great variety of creativity that receives protection
under copyright law. This is how the idea of thickness begins to take
shape.
Copyright protection has long been available only for works that
90
are deemed original. But copyright law has struggled to develop a
meaningful basis by which to operationalize its originality
91
requirement. Recognizing this difficulty, courts have come to use
substantial similarity’s ordinary-observer test as a means by which to
vary the protection that different works receive depending on their
level of originality. Works that are made up entirely of original and
creative expression continue to receive protection via the traditional

89. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991).
91. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (2009)
(“Copyright law fails to . . . calibrate the scope of the copyright protection to the degree of the
work’s originality.”).
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substantial-similarity requirement, and with it the ordinary-observer
92
or intended-audience test. On the other hand, when it comes to
works that contain unoriginal expression in addition to original
expression, most courts raise the standard of scrutiny needed to
93
establish that the copying was wrongful. They do so by examining
the similarity between the works using a “‘more discerning ordinary
94
observer’ test.” Beyond originality, courts adopt a similar approach
when trying to distinguish between the idea and the expression
95
underlying a work when the two are partially merged, or in
attempting to eliminate other unprotectible elements from the
96
comparison.
In this approach, the fact finder begins by identifying the
unprotectible elements of the work as before, i.e., as part of the
97
dissection exercise. It then requires examining whether the works
are substantially similar when compared as a whole under the
ordinary-observer standard. Yet in so doing, the fact finder is meant
to pay closer attention than previously to the protectible elements in
the work, control for the influence of the nonprotectible elements,
assess the contribution of the former to the substance and value of the

92. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]here the plaintiff’s
work contains no material imported from the public domain, the ‘more discerning’ test is
unnecessary.” (quoting Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1999))).
93. See id. (“[A] ‘more refined analysis’ is required where a plaintiff’s work is not ‘wholly
original,’ but rather incorporates elements from the public domain.” (quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc.
v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991))).
94. R. Ready Prods., Inc. v. Cantrell, 85 F. Supp. 2d 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (quoting
Hamil, 193 F.3d at 101–02, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d
65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hamil, 193 F.3d at 101 (“This
[more discerning ordinary-observer] test is applied when a work contains both protectible and
unprotectible elements, and requires the court to eliminate the unprotectible elements from its
consideration and to ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially
similar.” (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991))); Folio
Impressions, 937 F.2d at 766 (“[S]ince only some of the design enjoys copyright protection, the
observer’s attention must be more discerning.”).
95. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here
we compare products that contain both protectible and unprotectible elements, our inspection
must be ‘more discerning’; we must attempt to extract the unprotectible elements from our
consideration . . . .”).
96. See Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[W]here a design
contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, we have held that the observer’s
inspection must be more ‘discerning,’ ignoring those aspects of a work that are unprotectible in
making the comparison.” (quoting Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 765–66)).
97. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003 (“Having narrowed the scope of the copyright, we applied
the ‘more discerning’ ordinary-observer test and compared only the protected portion of the
design . . . .”).
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work, and then determine whether the defendant’s copying was
98
wrongful—a more “discerning” standard of scrutiny.
Some courts take this approach one step further and adopt a
sliding-scale approach to the ordinary-observer standard. They thus
acknowledge that there is a range of protection available to
copyrighted works that depends entirely on the amount of originality
99
that the work satisfies. The more original the work, the more
ordinary is the ordinary-observer standard, and the less original, the
more discerning is the standard. Highly “complex” or “fanciful”
works fall into the former category, whereas “simplistic” ones are
100
usually approached under the latter.
This variation of protection has also resulted, in its extreme
101
form, in what is today known as the “thin copyright” doctrine.
When the plaintiff’s work in question is highly unoriginal, uncreative,
or made up primarily of unprotectible material, courts adopt an even
more stringent approach to substantial similarity, occasionally
102
referred to as “super-substantial similarity.” Here, the copying is
thought to be problematic only when the works in question are
“virtually identical” and the duplication of protectible materials is
103
shown to have happened in its entirety. Compilations are a common

98. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1[B] (“In the more discerning
ordinary observer test, the fact finder attempts to extract the unprotectible elements from
consideration and determine whether the protectible elements as a whole are substantially
similar . . . . The fact finder should not dissect the works and then compare only individual
elements. The fact finder still must consider the works’ overall look and feel.”).
99. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th
Cir. 1982) (“As a work embodies more in the way of particularized expression, it . . . receives
broader copyright protection. . . . [T]he ‘strongest’ works . . . are almost entirely products of the
author’s creativity . . . .”), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985);
Pampered Chef Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[D]ifferent
types of materials may be subject to varying degrees of copyright protection. Materials that are
primarily fanciful, complex, artistic, novel and original are generally the most strongly protected
by copyrights . . . .”).
100. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
101. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2010);
MyWebGrocer LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 2004); Tufenkian
Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003); Ets-Hokin
v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When we apply the limiting doctrines,
subtracting the unoriginal elements, Ets-Hokin is left with only a ‘thin’ copyright, which protects
against only virtually identical copying.”).
102. See TransWestern Publ’g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773, 776
(10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Brennan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1258 (D.N.M. 2009).
103. Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994).
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category of works to which this approach is routinely employed, so as
to ensure that protection is limited to the “selection and
104
arrangement” of the expression and not to the expression itself.
Despite the variation in standard of scrutiny, courts continue to
adopt a holistic comparison of the works in terms of their overall
similarity. The variation comes about instead in the level of
discernment that a fact finder employs during such assessment—
greater attention to detail, purpose, and context while nonetheless
comparing the works in their entirety. The Second Circuit’s
observation in this regard is instructive:
In applying [the more discerning ordinary observer] test, a court
is not to dissect the works at issue into separate components and
compare only the copyrightable elements. To do so would be to take
the “more discerning” test to an extreme, which would result in
almost nothing being copyrightable because original works broken
down into their composite parts would usually be little more than
basic
unprotectible
elements
like
letters,
colors
and
symbols . . . . [W]e have nevertheless always recognized that the test
is guided by comparing the “total concept and feel” of the contested
105
works.

If the test of similarity remains the same but the person whose
eyes through which it is examined is to be considered more discerning,
it must imply that the person’s points of emphasis for assessing such
similarity begin to change. The process is therefore far from being a
mechanistic elimination of unprotectible elements and a comparison
of what remains thereafter. Even after recognizing elements to be
unprotectible, the court is still to compare the two works as a whole,
while underemphasizing the unprotectible parts in contrast to the
protectible parts, and analyzing their relative contributions to the
106
works in question. This contrast is particularly true when it comes to

104. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
105. Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995)).
106. Robert Osterberg and Eric Osterberg provide a good example using a hypothetical
involving two blues songs. In conducting the analysis, they note that the court
must remember that the songs are both blues songs. They share certain characteristics
with all blues songs, such as use of a twelvebar phrase. The fact finder must not
consider similarities common to all blues songs to determine whether the works are
substantially similar. Rather, the fact finder must apply the more discerning ordinary
observer test to decide whether, apart from the fact that the two songs are both blues
songs, the songs sound alike.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 3:1.1.
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works for which the protectible and unprotectible content is only
separable conceptually, such as in compilations or works with a
utilitarian element.
What this analysis reveals is that in reality there is an
intermediate step between the stages of dissection and similarity, one
with deep normative significance. Following the dissection or
extrinsic phase, the court doesn’t just jump into the inquiry of
whether the copying was wrongful. It pauses to set the appropriate
level of scrutiny to be applied during the assessment of similarity. It
determines here how thick the entitlement is to be, with thickness
bearing an inverse correlation to the level of scrutiny to be employed
in the second stage. This determination of thickness, however, is not
arbitrary or uninformed. It draws entirely from the court’s findings
during the dissection exercise—during which it decides how deserving
the work is of copyright protection, using copyright’s purposes and
107
goals, as well as the formal devices that instantiate them.
Courts, of course, rarely acknowledge the thickness
determination to be an intermediate step in the copying inquiry. Yet
its structure makes it precisely that. A recent opinion of the Ninth
Circuit applying the thinnest protection to a work comes closest to
recognizing this. In discussing the substantial-similarity analysis, the
court observed:
Having dissected the alleged similarities and considered the range of
possible expression, the court must define the scope of the plaintiff’s
copyright—that is, decide whether the work is entitled to “broad” or
“thin” protection. Depending on the degree of protection, the court
must set the appropriate standard for a subjective comparison of the
works to determine whether, as a whole, they are sufficiently similar
108
to support a finding of illicit copying.

The court here thus seems to acknowledge that following the
dissection exercise it needs to set the appropriate level of scrutiny
before proceeding to the wrongfulness determination. In actuality the
analysis of copying thus involves multiple steps, with thickness
forming an intermediate step between probative similarity and
substantial similarity (Figure 1). Because the thickness determination
informs the substantiality of the similarity analysis and is intimately

107. For an excellent example of how courts work this analysis, see Boisson, 273 F.2d at
273–76.
108. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1443.
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109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

17
1 U.S.C. § 302 (2
2006).
Id.
I § 106.
See,
S e.g., Feist Pub
bl’ns, Inc. v. Rura
al Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 3449 (1991).
See,
S e.g., Canal+ Image
I
UK Ltd. v.
v Lutvak, 773 F. S
Supp. 2d 419, 4322 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See,
S e.g., Trek Lea
asing, Inc. v. Uniited States, 66 Feed. Cl. 8, 14 (20055).
Nihon
N
Keizai Shim
mbun, Inc. v. Com
mline Bus. Data,, Inc., 166 F.3d 655, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).
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115

the comparison be of the “total concept and feel” or the “overall
116
look and feel” of the works rather than of individual components
and dissimilarities. In applying this general standard, they tend to
117
focus on both qualitative and quantitative elements.
The quantitative element involves assessing how much of the
protected work the defendant copied, a relatively straightforward
118
inquiry.
In using this quantitative variable, courts sometimes
examine whether a de minimis threshold for copying has been crossed
119
and no more. The qualitative element, on the other hand, examines
the value and significance of the copied material to the plaintiff’s (as
120
opposed to the defendant’s) work. Here the question is always
whether the defendant took something from the plaintiff’s work that
was worthy of protection against the defendant’s copying. The
qualitative threshold introduces an important temporal dimension to
the analysis, insofar as the decision maker is asked to focus on the
value of the elements taken by the defendant’s copying to the
plaintiff’s work as manifested in the work, and no more. Thus if a
portrait of a person, an artistic work, has material in the background
that is largely incidental to the original work and which is copied by a
defendant and assumes prominence later on, the qualitative threshold
allows the court to conclude that the copied material was not of value
to the first work. This determination is based entirely on the court’s
analysis of the plaintiff’s work and consequently on the point in time
121
that it was created.

115. E.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985).
116. E.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
117. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Substantiality is
measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied portion in
relation to the plaintiff’s work as a whole.”); Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d
1366, 1376–77 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering the “[a]mount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”).
118. See Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 (finding that the infringer “use[d] about two-thirds of the
protectible material”).
119. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4.
120. Id. But see Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The material taken is
not qualitatively important to either [the original or copied work].”).
121. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 2:4 (justifying the rule as “permit[ting]
authors to build on existing works by focusing on details that earlier authors may have glossed
over or otherwise treated in a more cursory fashion”).
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To be sure, the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the
122
analysis often intersect and influence each other. The key point to
remember for our purposes, though, is that the similarity assessment
at this stage operates as a proxy for the wrongfulness of the
defendant’s actions. The comparison of similarity therefore is largely
to determine whether the defendant’s copying, when viewed as a
whole, meets the decision maker’s intuitive sense of wrongfulness,
calibrated by the appropriate standard of scrutiny. This accounts for
why courts sometimes describe the similarity assessment as “virtually
123
devoid of analysis.” Though this does not imply that the assessment
is devoid of an analytical framework altogether, it does emphasize
that it remains a subjective value judgment that is guided by reason.
When courts alter the thickness of the entitlement using various
criteria, the parameters of the comparison in the wrongfulness
analysis begin to change, too. While the comparison must still remain
of the overall work, and entail both quantitative and qualitative
124
dimensions, the points of emphasis begin to change. Instead of a
casual overall observation of the work, the court now weighs the
protectible parts of the work more heavily than the others, and the
most valuable parts of the work are given the heaviest weight. It thus
entails an examination which—while not entailing the artificial
elimination of unprotectible works—begins to accord different parts
of the work differential emphasis in light of the level of discernment
125
required by the appropriate standard. The alteration that occurs
thus involves ensuring that the data points for the comparison are
weighted appropriately to simulate an observer with heightened
126
knowledge of the works in question and their market.
One way that courts operationalize this variation is by explicitly
altering the characteristics and traits of the discerning observer in

122. Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 (“It is not possible to determine infringement through a simple
word count; the quantitative analysis of two works must always occur in the shadow of their
qualitative nature.”).
123. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that the test has
become “virtually devoid of analysis” because it “has become a mere subjective judgment as to
whether two literary works are or are not similar”).
124. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001).
125. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[F][5] (emphasizing the nonmechanical
and subjective nature of the evaluation, even after the unprotectible parts have been
eliminated).
126. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 135 (2d
Cir. 2003) (noting that the test cannot be applied through the eyes of “the judicial observer who
has a passing familiarity with [the market]”).
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light of the nature of the works in question. In a case involving the
infringement of a board game with original and unoriginal features,
for instance, the Ninth Circuit applied the standard of a “discerning
17.5 year old boy” to find that an ordinary observer was unlikely to
find the two works to be similar based on the elements that such an
127
observer was likely to emphasize during the comparison. In another
case involving a video game with large amounts of unprotectible
material, the Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that a discerning
observer in this market was likely to pay much more attention to the
functional features of the game rather than to the artistic expression,
128
or to the aesthetic appeal that it has. One court likened the
“reasonably discerning consumer” to one who would spend thousands
of dollars on the products in question to conclude that such an
ordinary observer was unlikely to be deceived as to the origin of the
129
works. This process closely mirrors the way in which courts have
long been known to alter the reasonable person standard in
negligence cases, depending on the nature and type of harm
130
involved. The reasonable person may thus be a professional well
versed in a particular discipline in instances of professional
131
negligence, and in other instances a mere prudent man. Few would
deny, though, that in varying the reasonable person in negligence
cases, courts are doing anything but altering their very assessment of
the wrongfulness of the defendant’s actions by introducing or
eliminating variables that the fictional person might have
132
considered. The same process is at play here.

127. Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209–10 (9th Cir. 1988).
128. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“Video games, unlike an artist’s painting or even other audiovisual works, appeal to an
audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their concern about more subtle differences in
artistic expression.”), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985).
129. Odegard Inc. v. Safavieh Carpets, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
130. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324
(2012). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010) (discussing the factors to be
considered in determining whether a defendant exercised “reasonable” care under the
circumstances in question).
131. See, e.g., Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. 1979) (“Indeed, our
courts have long recognized that one who engages in a business, occupation, or profession must
exercise the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability of that calling with reasonable and
ordinary care.”).
132. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1747 (1976); Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 317, 317–18 (1914) (“The ‘ordinary prudent man’ is a palpable fiction . . . . What this
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D. The Flexibility of Substantial Similarity
In functional terms the substantial-similarity analysis involves
two distinct stages: a court’s selection of a standard of wrongfulness
or similarity for the analysis—the thickness determination—and its
eventual application of that standard to its comparison of the two
works—the similarity analysis. Putting the two prongs of the
substantial-similarity analysis back together reveals that courts use it
as a distinct dimension of the copyright entitlement under which
different works are accorded different amounts of protection on an
individualized basis. The variation in protection is best represented by
Table 1 below.

Thickness

Table 1.

Level of
Protection

Standard of
Scrutiny

Regular

“Ordinary
observer”

Intermediate

Thin

Focus of Analysis

Overall similarity over
differences
Overall similarity but
“More discerning
with differences
observer”
weighted appropriately
Overall similarity with
special attention to the
“Near identity” conceptually
inseparable source of
protection

Copyright law treats a variety of different works in a largely
identical manner. This treatment is in turn known to produce what
133
some scholars refer to as “uniformity costs.” Although scholars
have lamented copyright’s lack of adequate tailoring to combat these
134
costs, few have focused on the reality that courts have long been
attempting to achieve precisely this result under the substantial135
similarity analysis. To be sure, the process is far more subtle and
nuanced than an explicit approach to subject-matter-based tailoring—
that is, according different types of works different rights—and is
imaginary person would have done really means what the jury thinks was the proper thing to
do . . . .”).
133. See Carroll, supra note 22, at 85667, 87578.
134. Id. at 85667.
135. But see id. at 899.
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often cloaked in the rhetoric of the similarity analysis. Yet on closer
analysis, it reveals how courts have been using copyright’s structure as
a wrong-based approach to creative inducement to achieve such
tailoring.
Instead of introducing new a priori filters based either on subject
matter or the institution’s purposes—which might be seen as an
incursion into Congress’s domain, considering that these elements
136
have historically been determined legislatively —courts instead
modulate the scope of protection during their analysis of
infringement. Copyright’s extensive emphasis on copying—both as a
factual and normative matter—allows courts to achieve this
modulation rather effectively. In practice, then, copyright’s
entitlement structure is much more pliable than it comes across in
theory, revealing how a unidimensional focus on legislative activity in
the area often understates the importance of federal common-law
137
rules that play an equally important role in the system’s operation.
None of this is to suggest that courts have developed a unified,
coherent framework for the substantial-similarity analysis. Although
few courts have explicitly acknowledged their use of the framework
as a mechanism of entitlement modulation or as a policy lever, they
nonetheless have in the last two decades begun to incrementally
expand the substantive content of the analysis and explicate more on
138
what goes into it. The time is thus ripe for a more comprehensive
account of what the substantial-similarity analysis can and ought to be
used for, given how far courts have come with it and their general
willingness to make effective use of the flexibility and leeway
accorded to them in the analysis.
The analysis of copyright’s substantial-similarity requirement
also reveals that in reality it involves two interrelated normative

136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
137. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 52 (2010)
(focusing on copyright reform through statutory changes).
138. The Seventh Circuit is perhaps the most explicit about this. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N.
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 61617 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]hat a work is
copyrighted says very little about the scope of its protection.”), superseded on other grounds by
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985); see also Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States., 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 1718
(2005) (describing the incremental expansion of the idea of “thin” copyright protection);
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, at § 3:1.5 (“[C]ourts in the Seventh Circuit make a
distinction between probative similarity, similarity that proves copying, and substantial
similarity, similarity that proves unlawful appropriation.”).
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judgments during the infringement process. The first, which we may
usefully call the purposive evaluation and which is seen during the
thickness determination, involves an objective assessment of the work
being accorded protection to measure the extent to which it furthers
139
copyright’s fundamental purposes. Put simply, it entails fixing the
thickness of the copyright holder’s exclusive entitlement in the work,
disregarding the defendant’s work. Though the court is no doubt
presented with evidence of copying here, this evaluation and the
court’s determination of thickness must conceptually at least take
place independent of the defendant’s actions. For instance,
determining the ratio of protectible to unprotectible material in a
work hardly necessitates examining the defendant’s work and can be
gleaned entirely from the plaintiff’s work, perhaps with the aid of
external evidence such as expert testimony.
The second normative decision originates in the similarity
analysis and involves a subjective evaluation of wrongdoing. Here, the
fact finder is asked to apply the chosen standard of thickness to a
comparison of the two works in order to determine whether there was
140
any actionable wrongdoing in the defendant’s act of copying.
Whereas the first stage was conceptually objective, this stage is
entirely relative because a comparison of the works is the essence of
the process. While the purposive evaluation fixes the appropriate
standard of scrutiny, it importantly does not tell the fact finder
precisely what goes into that standard except in very general terms.
The fact finder is thus directed to consciously alter the standard of
scrutiny by paying close attention to certain elements of the work and
by applying a suitably altered perspective.
Each of these normative judgments involves a different
structural framework which is crucial to appreciate—for it is only
through this difference that copyright law is able to affirm multiple,
often conflicting normative values in its adjudication process. Each
stage of normative analysis also communicates a different guidance
directive to actors—the first stage communicates an objective one,
141
while the second stage signals a relational one —and has a hitherto
underappreciated effect on copyright’s upstream- and downstream-

139. See supra Part I.B.
140. See supra Part I.C.
141. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 94547 (2010).
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This latter set of issues is fully explored in the

II. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
Having examined how the substantial-similarity inquiry works
and the underappreciated flexibility that it affords courts in tailoring
copyright’s entitlement structure on an individualized basis, this Part
moves from the positive to the normative. It argues that the twopronged process of the substantial-similarity analysis can be
reconstructed as a mechanism of conceptually ordering the
introduction and instantiation of plural values into the copyright
analysis. The flexibility examined in the previous Part, in other words,
can be understood as possessing an important substantive dimension,
in addition to a structural one.
Part II.A begins by setting out the problems inherent in
multicriterion-based decision making, long known in the world of
social-choice theory, to show how copyright adjudication as a branch
of legal decision making harbors the same problems. Part II.B then
introduces the idea of the conceptually sequenced argument as a
partial solution to the problem of incommensurable values, drawing
on other areas of the common law in which it is employed as a
reasoned accommodation of plural values. Part II.C then moves back
to the world of copyright law to reconstruct substantial similarity and
its two-staged normative analysis as a sequenced ordering of different
kinds of values during the infringement inquiry. In the first step,
copyright’s principally utilitarian values find their place and are given
direct salience by the thickness inquiry, while in the second,
copyright’s relational values, many of which are deontic or rightsbased in structure, find instantiation during the analysis of similarity.
A. Copyright Adjudication as a Form of Multicriterial Decision
Making
Central to social-choice theory is the idea of majority-voting
paradoxes, under which an attempt to aggregate the preferences of
individual voters, in order to reach a majority decision, produces an

142. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response, Tiered Originality and the Dualism of
Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 69 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2009/11/30/balganesh.
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intransitivity. Thus, if there are three candidates to choose from
(John, Henry, and Bill) and three voters whose preferences are to be
aggregated (A, B, and C) the following ordering of their preferences
144
represents the intransitivity of majority decision making.
A
John
Henry
Bill

B
Henry
Bill
John

C
Bill
John
Henry

As we see, a majority of voters (A, C) prefer John to Henry, and
a majority (A, B) also prefers Henry to Bill. The logic of transitivity
would suggest that a majority would also prefer John to Bill. Yet, as it
turns out, a majority (B, C) actually prefers Bill to John—producing
an intransitivity. The very same logic carries over to decision making
that isn’t simply trying to aggregate the preferences of multiple
individuals, but is instead trying to aggregate preferences based on
multiple independent criteria. Consider the following alternative
hypothetical, which reveals the symmetry: You are deciding on a new
car to buy, and you narrow your choice down to three: a Honda, a
Ferrari, and a Ford, and you are now trying to choose among the
145
three using three independent—and equally important—criteria:
price, reliability, and speed. This is how you might order the cars on
this basis:
Price
Ford
Honda
Ferrari

Reliability
Honda
Ferrari
Ford

Speed
Ferrari
Ford
Honda

Again, the same intransitivity manifests itself. The Ford beats the
Honda on price and speed, while the Honda beats the Ferrari on
price and reliability, but the Ferrari beats the Ford on both speed and

143. Bruce Chapman, More Easily Done Than Said: Rules, Reasons, and Rational Social
Choice, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 29697 (1998).
144. See ARROW, supra note 33.
145. This is an important axiom. In the event that the criteria themselves can be weighted
differently—which would be the equivalent of treating different voters differently in the
election—the problem dissipates in large measure.
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reliability. Assuming that each criterion is equally important, there is
no way of combining the preferences to yield a single choice. The
intransitivity seen in the two examples above would continue to exist
even if we were to reduce the number of criteria or voters to two. It
would then turn into the following preference orderings—which
exhibit the same features.
A
John
Henry
Bill

B
Henry
Bill
John

Price
Ford
Honda
Ferrari

Reliability
Honda
Ferrari
Ford

Once again, it becomes impossible to aggregate the preferences
into a single decision, though it becomes possible to eliminate a
choice in each instance if we are looking for a winner: Bill in the
voting, and the Ferrari in the choice of car. Yet among the other two
choices, no obvious winner emerges.
Legal decision making in innumerable contexts exhibits these
very features of multicriterion decision making. By introducing
additional criteria into the picture, it alters the law’s ordering of
146
preferences and outcomes. Professor Leo Katz has persuasively
shown how this produces legal “loopholes” which are incapable of
being plugged and therefore form the bread and butter of
147
lawyering. The introduction of new criteria and alternatives thus
alters the original ordering of relative preferences.
What is additionally important to forms of legal decision making
is that the setting is invariably relational. In other words, because a
court is often confronted with a binary choice between plaintiff and
defendant, sometimes criteria that are entirely a product of that
binary setup enter the picture to alter the original preference
ordering. In some very illuminating work on social-choice theory,
Professor Bruce Chapman has shown that this is precisely how the
148
intransitivity of preferences affects legal decision making. In a
hypothetical he shows how an individual’s urge to maximize pleasure

146. See KATZ, supra note 34, at 6–7.
147. See Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (2010) (“[L]oophole
exploitation and skillful persuasion turn out to differ only by a hair, and inasmuch as we never
felt too uneasy about the latter, we have one more reason not to feel too uneasy about the
former.”).
148. Chapman, supra note 40, at 1502.
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might cause him or her to choose a medium-sized orange over a small
149
apple, and a big apple over the medium-sized orange. Yet, when
presented with the option of a small and a big apple, the individual
chooses the small apple out of a new consideration—etiquette—that
seems to enter the picture only in a choice between different sizes of
150
the same fruit.
These preferences now produce the same
intransitivity as before: the big apple is preferred to the orange, the
orange to the small apple but surprisingly, the small apple to the big
151
apple.
What we thus see happening in situations in which the decision is
framed in binary, relational terms is that values that are best realized
in their maximization lose their dominance to other values that are
152
relative or comparative in nature.
In Professor Chapman’s
hypothetical, the hedonistic ideal of maximizing one’s pleasure
through the largest possible fruit doesn’t disappear in the final choice
between apples; rather, it is overridden by etiquette, which becomes
more salient, and therefore “dominant,” when the frame is
153
comparative. This is precisely what happens in the context of legal
adjudication: even when the law purports to maximize welfare,
interpersonal considerations such as fairness and justice come into the
154
picture. In choosing between the plaintiff and the defendant, courts
simply do not focus exclusively on the result that is likely to maximize
overall welfare while ignoring comparative considerations between
155
the parties to the dispute.
The same considerations enter the picture in copyright law.
Copyright’s principal justification is utilitarian. According to this
ideal, which is largely accepted by courts, scholars, and legislators,
156
copyright’s primary purpose remains the inducement of creativity.
By providing creators with limited exclusivity over their creative

149. Id. at 1498.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 149899.
152. Id. at 150102.
153. Id. at 1502.
154. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
54043 (1972).
155. But see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52–62
(2002).
156. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1577 (2009).
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works, copyright is thought to induce the creation of those works.
The economic analysis of copyright law, which builds on this basic
utilitarian framework, further posits that the system attempts to
provide creators with the most socially efficient incentive mechanism,
158
represented in the incentives-access tradeoff.
This general
utilitarian ideal is also thought to derive from the Constitution’s
mandate that copyright law “promote the Progress” of the sciences
and the useful arts through a system of exclusive rights—a
proposition that the Supreme Court has come to affirm time after
159
time. Maximizing social welfare, or overall utility, thus lies at the
heart of what copyright as an institution is trying to achieve. At the
same time though, copyright adjudication—much like all other forms
of adjudication—is bilateral in structure and substance. In
adjudicating a claim for infringement, the court must invariably
choose between the plaintiff and the defendant. Inter-subjective or
comparative considerations thus invariably enter the picture, and
much like in other contexts, offset the ordering of preferences based
exclusively on the concern with maximizing welfare.
Utility
Thick Protection
Thin Protection
No Protection

Personality
No Protection
160
Thick/Thin Protection

157. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
158. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 613 (1962).
159. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012)
(“Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science . . . .”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“The ‘constitutional command,’ we have recognized, is that Congress, to
the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of
Science.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1965)) (alteration
in original)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The
rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a
fair return for their labors.”).
160. The precise ranking of thick and thin protection becomes irrelevant in the binary
choice between the plaintiff and the defendant, because either way “protection” involves
finding for the plaintiff-creator, which the court chooses not to.
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Going back to our hypothetical involving da Vinci and Dalí,
then, on purely utilitarian considerations—and based exclusively on
an analysis of da Vinci’s work and creativity—a judge would be
inclined to favor da Vinci. But when the choice is narrowed down to
Dalí and da Vinci, such that the wrongfulness of Dalí’s actions
becomes salient, the choice might reverse itself because comparative
considerations are capable of overriding the ideal of utility
maximization in the abstract. Following from the discussion in the
162
previous Part,
a judge might thus—based on an assessment
exclusively of da Vinci’s work—favor thick protection over no
protection and thin protection over no protection. We might logically
assume that the ordering of preferences is as follows: thick protection
is preferred to thin protection which is preferred to no protection. Yet
when Dalí’s copying enters the picture and the court considers Dalí’s
actions—to realize that his copying is insubstantial and of parts that
do not manifest da Vinci’s personality interest in the work—the court
is likely to now choose no protection over either thick or thin
protection. Much like in other areas of multicriterial decision making,
we have a problem of aggregating values.
B. Conceptual Sequencing as a Partial Solution
In trying to find a solution to the paradoxes of majority-voting
preferences and multicriterial decision making, Arrow eventually
concluded that a coherent, rational aggregation was indeed
163
impossible. This was the gist of his “impossibility theorem,” as it
164
came to be known —and to date, no one has shown it to be wholly
wrong. Probing a little deeper into Arrow’s framework, however,
reveals that his primary concern with the paradox of intransitive
preferences had to do with its likely consequences on decision
processes. As Chapman points out, Arrow was concerned that the
“collectively irrational social choice would show itself as a kind of
165
arbitrary dependence of the final social choice on the choice path.”
The concern was thus that the intransitivity would result in a choice
161. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON.
328, 342 (1950).
164. The formal proof was titled the “General Possibility Theorem.” In due course, it came
to acquire the name it currently holds. Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review
Article, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 1764, 1765 (1984).
165. Chapman, supra note 143, at 297.
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that followed a form of path dependence, which was arbitrarily or
166
strategically chosen. This enabled an adept agenda setter to produce
whatever result she wants by determining the decision path to be
applied. Arrow’s concern was thus less with path dependence per se
167
and more with an arbitrarily or strategically chosen one. What this
tells us is that if the path dependence is chosen neither arbitrarily nor
strategically—but based on a reasoned priority—a large part of the
concern motivating the problem of social choice begins to disappear.
Legal adjudication, in contrast to numerous other forms of
decision making, takes processes, institutions, and values very
seriously. Rules and precedents preserve a form of path dependence
of their own, and that produces a discernible level of consistency
across time and context. Consequently, a partial solution to the
problem of incoherence in multicriterial decision making lies in
replacing the possibility of an arbitrary or strategic path dependence
168
with a reason-based one. This is the idea behind the process of
conceptual sequencing, under which different criteria are allowed to
enter the decision-making process sequentially, in recognition of their
relative importance to the decision process under consideration,
169
thereby giving them each sequential play in the final decision. The
most prominent modern reconstruction of the idea of defeasible rules
as a mechanism of conceptual sequencing is found in the work of
Professor Chapman, who has sought to apply it to explain the
170
workings of tort and criminal law.
In a series of insightful papers, Chapman shows how tort law can
be seen as accommodating both rights-based arguments—that is,
corrective justice—and welfare-driven arguments, within its

166. Id. at 29697; Bruce Chapman, Law Games: Defeasible Rules and Revisable Rationality,
17 LAW & PHIL. 443, 453 n.23 (1998). Professor Chapman describes this as a “structure-induced
equilibrium.” Chapman, supra note 143, at 295.
167. Chapman, supra note 143, at 303; see also Arrow, supra note 163, at 330 (“For any
method of deriving social choices by aggregating individual preference patterns which satisfies
certain natural conditions, it is possible to find individual preference patters which give rise to a
social choice pattern which is not a linear ordering.”).
168. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1496 (“[T]here are . . . grounds for thinking that . . . the
theory of rational choice and value maximization provides only a very partial or incomplete
understanding of rationality as reason-based choice.”).
169. Id. at 1508.
170. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Towards a Reasonable
Accommodation, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276, 30812 (Gerald J. Postema ed.,
2001); Chapman, supra note 166, at 446; Chapman, supra note 40, at 1509.
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171

framework. Beginning with the recognition that ordinarily tort law
prioritizes the right over the good in its corrective-justice structure,
Chapman illustrates how it nonetheless carves out room for welfare172
based considerations at the peripheries of its framework. One
prominent example is the concept of “unreasonable risk,” a concept
173
which courts unpack using a two-staged analysis. In the first stage
they examine the reasonable foreseeability of the risk, applying a
reasonable-person standard. In the second stage they ask what the
reasonable person would do when faced with this risk. Yet, when the
risk is found to be small or insubstantial Chapman notes that courts
introduce a third stage of analysis, which involves assessing the cost to
the defendant of eliminating the risk in question—an inquiry into the
174
“burden of precautions.”
Until this last step, the analysis
consciously avoids introducing utilitarian variables into the decision
making, and when it does it succeeds in ordering those variables
sequentially after other considerations such that they are rendered
incapable of directly conflicting with rights-based considerations. In
conceptual sequencing, the law thus partitions the inquiry into stages
such that each stage limits the criteria that a decision maker uses in
175
choosing between options. The path dependence is thus a form of
“partition dependence”—with the sequence of partitions chosen on
176
the basis of reasons relating to the institution in question.
Chapman argues that the same sequential pattern can be
detected in Professor Richard Epstein’s well-known account of
nuisance law as an institution structured around “corrective justice”
177
with “utilitarian constraints.” In his account, Epstein draws a
distinction between the elements of a prima facie case of nuisance—
which involves the invasion of a legally protected interest—and the
defendant’s ability to thereafter introduce an additional set of
considerations, all of which seem to derive from utilitarian concerns
178
independent of the defendant’s invasion. Chapman rightly claims

171. See Chapman, supra note 170; Chapman, supra note 40, at 150714.
172. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1509–14, 1521–26; see also Chapman, supra note 143, at
31012.
173. Chapman, supra note 40, at 152126.
174. Id. at 1525.
175. Id. at 152425.
176. Chapman, supra note 143, at 305.
177. Chapman, supra note 40, at 151114; see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law:
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979).
178. Epstein, supra note 177, at 4950; see also Chapman, supra note 40, at 1511.
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that Epstein’s account is best understood as a conceptually sequenced
argument that attempts to sequence the introduction of rights-based
179
and welfarist values into the nuisance decision-making process.
Chapman also ascribes a similar structure to Professor George
180
Fletcher’s account of excuses in criminal law.
Central to conceptual sequencing as a mechanism of
accommodating plural values is the requirement that the sequencing
181
have a reason for its conceptual ordering. In other words, there
must be a basis for the law’s choice of a particular sequence in which
to introduce variables and values into the decision making, for
without such a reason the demarcation may be considered arbitrarily
path dependent, or as doing no more than eliding the problem of
182
value incommensurability.
Sequencing, in other words, must
originate in a prioritization of values that is internal to the system.
For tort law, this ordering is thought to derive from the priority of
corrective justice over utilitarian goals, and in criminal law from the
183
priority of wrongdoing and human agency over other variables. In
this way, conceptual sequencing allows tort law to accommodate both
corrective justice and deterrence and allows criminal law to do the
same with compassion, retribution, and deterrence.
Another particularly good example of a conceptually sequenced
explanation for tort law’s plural values comes from no less a believer
184
in corrective justice theory than Professor Ernest Weinrib. While
arguing that tort law—and indeed all of private law—is premised on
the idea of corrective justice, he concedes that the process of
conceptual sequencing can explain how the system of tort law in
185
reality serves the purposes of deterrence. To him, the fact that the
law’s practice of corrective justice is ensconced in positive law means
it can perform additional functions of law “qua positive law,”
186
including deterrence. Deterrence here is thus viewed as furthering

179. Chapman, supra note 40, at 1512.
180. Id. at 151520; see also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 949, 95457 (1985).
181. See Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and
Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 6483 (1994).
182. Id. at 47.
183. Chapman, supra note 40, at 151920, 152425.
184. Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002).
185. Id. at 63839.
186. Id. at 638.
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corrective justice “while leaving it intact,” but entirely through the
187
process of conceptual sequencing.
What is perhaps obvious from this discussion of conceptual
sequencing is that the examples thus far all tend to unambiguously
prioritize the right over the good—that is, rights-based arguments,
such as corrective justice or retribution, over utilitarian ones, such as
deterrence. In none of the examples Chapman uses to illustrate the
concept does he identify an instance in which this ordering is
reversed—even though he considers the theoretical possibility of it
188
manifesting itself in multiple places. In other words, can there be a
legal institution in which the decision-making process is sequenced so
as to first allow for a prima facie entitlement that is utilitarian in
structure, followed by a temporally subsequent introduction of
nonutilitarian values into the process? The substantial-similarity
analysis in copyright law, I argue, represents precisely such a
sequenced formulation in copyright decision making.
C. Accommodating Plural Values in Copyright Law
Despite the dominance of copyright’s utilitarian theory, most
scholars tend to agree that other, distinctly nonutilitarian values play
some role in the overall structural and functional dimensions of the
189
institution. Of these, authors’ rights-based conceptions of the
copyright entitlement are perhaps the most dominant, according to
which copyright law serves a set of autonomy-related purposes
internal to the author, and often independent of the institution’s
190
overall utilitarian ideals. Yet, copyright law and scholarship have
struggled to develop a coherent mechanism by which to achieve the
187. Id. at 639.
188. Chapman, supra note 40, at 151213; Chapman, supra note 166, at 454.
189. See, e.g., DAVID LANGE & JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 169 (2009); Keith Aoki, Distributive and
Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and
Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 720 (2006); Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive
Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45, 72 (2007); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
3
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 361–64 (1996); Madhavi Sunder, IP , 59 STAN. L.
REV. 257, 312 (2006); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1535, 153967 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor
and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 52231 (1990).
190. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4860 (1994);
Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A
Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 398441 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright
Alienability Restrictions].
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reasonable accommodation of these nonutilitarian goals and values
191
with the institution’s core utilitarian foundation. This failure has in
turn resulted in copyright’s nonutilitarian ideals either receding into
the backdrop and diminishing in significance or, alternatively, in their
being reconceptualized in distinctly utilitarian terms in order to
achieve their accommodation (through a direct tradeoff) with the
192
institution’s widely accepted utilitarian tenets.
The two-staged process of substantial similarity, on the other
hand, reveals an ideal mechanism by which to achieve just such an
accommodation, given its conceptually sequenced structure. In so
doing, it keeps the two sets of values separate and affirms them both,
but in a sequenced order. Yet a major move that it makes is that it
treats the nonutilitarian variable as a comparative inquiry rather than
as a transcendent one that needs to be maximized in the abstract. In
the process, the personality-based determination feeds into
considerations of corrective justice that lie at the heart of copyright’s
liability determination. The discussion below describes this in greater
detail.
1. Thickness as Copyright’s Utilitarian Inquiry. Recall that the
first part of the substantial-similarity inquiry involves the court
determining the extent to which the plaintiff’s work in question serves
copyright’s goals. Though it happens simultaneously with a dissection
of the defendant’s work, the court here examines how meritorious the
work is of copyright protection and accordingly fixes the standard of
193
scrutiny to be applied in the second stage. This step is comparative
only in a nominal sense, because the focus is in reality on the
protected work: to examine what parts of it are unprotectible, and
indeed how protectible it is as a whole. Somewhat counterintuitively,
courts often examine the defendant’s work to compare it to the

191. Two previous strategies are worth mentioning. The first, is the “monist” theory of
copyright, according to which copyright’s utilitarian (that is, economic) purposes are
“subsumed” within the rights-based, or autonomy-driven purposes. Netanel, Copyright
Alienability Restrictions, supra note 190, at 378. The second involves the argument that the idea
of incentives—the gravamen of copyright’s utilitarian theory—can take color from noneconomic
motivations as well, such as spiritual, religious, and personal ones. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1945, 1975 (2006).
192. See, e.g., Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012).
193. See supra Part I.B.
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plaintiff’s, but in principle the determination is confined to the
194
plaintiff’s work.
What remains largely unappreciated is that in this first step
courts effectively scrutinize the work in question against copyright’s
systemic, utilitarian goal of inducing creative expression with minimal
cost to society. According to this goal, which remains rooted in the
basic premises of welfare economics, the institution of copyright
promotes overall social welfare by limiting the ability of noncreators
to copy a creative work, thereby inducing creators to produce such
work to begin with. Copyright law’s internal devices are, under this
theory, directed at ensuring the realization of this inducement, while
minimizing the social costs that the inducement entails. Courts use
the thickness determination to realize this objective. To be sure, they
have thus far only ever used copyright’s formal devices as
benchmarks for the comparison: the originality requirement, the ideaexpression distinction, the exclusion for useful elements of a work,
and the assurance that compilations are accorded protection on the
selection, coordination, and arrangement of underlying material.
Each of these variables has over time come to be understood as doing
no more than serving copyright’s utilitarian purpose. Ever since Feist,
the originality requirement has unquestionably come to be
understood as deriving from the Constitution’s utilitarian mandate for
copyright law and the underlying costs associated with according
195
protection to unoriginal or uncreative works. In a similar vein, the
idea-expression dichotomy is treated by courts as a device by which to
minimize copyright’s monopoly costs by balancing incentives and
196
access. The same is equally true with the exclusion for useful works
and the protection for compilations—with courts often explicitly
reasoning that these formal devices do no more than prevent the
197
plaintiff from obtaining a socially inefficient monopoly. Regardless
of the context under which these concepts and devices originated,
they are today understood in principally utilitarian terms.
As a structural matter, too, thickness lends itself perfectly to
being used as a vehicle by which to give effect to copyright’s
194. See supra Part I.B.
195. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
196. See A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980);
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 71112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 4 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[B][2][a].
197. See Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th
Cir. 1997); Batlin v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976).
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utilitarian ideals. Unlike other dimensions of the copyright
entitlement, which tend to operate in largely binary terms, its
structure as a continuum forces courts to directly engage the question
of not just whether the work at issue furthers copyright’s purposes,
but also how much it furthers those purposes. Thickness can thus be
understood as a principally utilitarian inquiry, in which courts
determine how much protection a work needs to obtain based on the
extent to which it furthers copyright’s goal of inducing creative
expression. Given the underlying utilitarian emphasis within the
variables that courts consider at this stage, there seems to be little
reason not to factor in additional variables that derive from the same
set of utilitarian goals that have long been known to motivate
copyright law.
What is additionally interesting in understanding thickness as a
mechanism by which to give effect to copyright’s utilitarian goals is
how it also effectively converts copyright law’s existing binary
utilitarian calculations into ones that can be understood as lying along
a continuum. Originality, for instance, is often understood as a value
that merits being operationalized only in binary terms. Either a work
198
is original and therefore protectible, or it is not. So, too, with the
merger doctrine: either the idea and expression in a work are merged,
199
rendering the whole unprotectible, or they are not. Thickness allows
courts to parse these categories out further, in the process identifying
shades of originality—or the extent to which idea and expression have
merged—without having to decide the issue in purely binary terms.
Realizing copyright’s utilitarian objectives is most often a matter of
degree, because in some abstract sense granting any work some
protection can be seen as furthering copyright’s goal of inducing
creativity. The question is invariably one of how much protection and
at what cost, a question which requires a more granular and tailored
approach—one that thickness allows courts to adopt.
This brings us in turn to the task of determining what additional
utilitarian values and variables might be capable of being given effect
in this stage of the inquiry. The first thing to remember about the
utilitarian calculus that this stage entails is that it operates in the
198. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91, at 1506. My argument here, however,
disagrees with their subsequent observation that “[c]opyright law fails to take the next step and
calibrate the scope of the copyright protection to the degree of the work’s originality.” Id.; see
also Balganesh, supra note 142, at 75–76.
199. See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 91 (2007).
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individual rather than the aggregate. In other words, the cost-benefit
calculus that the utilitarian analysis entails occurs at the level of the
individual work being scrutinized by the court during the
infringement inquiry. This in turn explains why courts are willing to
conduct this inquiry through the lens of formal devices, such as
originality, rather than directly, in the belief that these devices and
the tests used to operationalize them derive from a prior aggregate
analysis, which is then capable of being instantiated at the individual
200
level. This maps onto the long-known distinction between act and
201
rule utilitarianism. Whereas rule utilitarianism derives from a belief
that a rule in question reflects an underlying utilitarian goal and that
adherence to the rule will result in the realization of that goal, act
utilitarianism derives from a belief that the utilitarian goal can only
be realized through the measurement of the individual act directly
against the goal sought to be realized. Rule utilitarianism thus derives
from a generalization about the tendency of an act, ordinarily dealt
202
with by the rule, to produce utilitarian consequences. In carrying
out the thickness analysis, courts have thus far adhered in large
measure to a rule-utilitarianism approach.
All the same, there seems little reason to believe that courts are
unlikely to move away from it when presented with methods of
instantiating copyright’s utilitarian ideals directly, that is, in actutilitarianism terms. Indeed, a well-known objection to the
sustainability of utilitarianism through rules is that in the end it
203
collapses into a form of act utilitarianism. Circumstances will
emerge over time in which noncompliance with a rule begins to
204
produce more utility than compliance. The rule then begins to
develop exceptions and subrules, and over time the key question in
each instance becomes which subrule or exception applies and is to be
followed, which in turn eventually results in the actor choosing the
205
one that maximizes utility, an act-utilitarian inquiry. Consequently,
having courts undertake the thickness inquiry by weighing copyright’s

200. See supra Part I.B.
201. The leading account of this distinction is by Professor David Lyons. See DAVID LYONS,
FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 2–4 (1965).
202. Id. at 4.
203. See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 9,
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule.
204. Id.
205. LYONS, supra note 201, at 11930. But see Boruch A. Brody, The Equivalence of Act
and Rule Utilitarianism, 18 PHIL. STUD. 81, 8186 (1967).
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utilitarian goals directly, rather than through formal rules, is not as far
removed in practice as it might seem in principle.
An additional variable that courts might be able to consider
during the thickness analysis is the extent to which the work derives
from a market-driven creative motivation, the central idea behind the
utilitarian-inducement theory. In situations in which a work originates
in motivations that involve a large noncommercial component, courts
might alter the thickness of protection to reflect the reduced extent to
which the work furthers copyright’s utilitarian goal of creative
inducement. In recent work, Professor Lydia Loren has suggested
206
that courts adopt an approach along these lines. Very interestingly,
we see courts willing to undertake this examination on the
defendant’s side as part of the fair-use analysis, in which they closely
examine whether the defendant’s use of the protected work was for
commercial or noncommercial purposes as one of the fair-use
207
factors. An examination of commercial intent or motivation would
thus do little more than transpose this to the plaintiff’s side of the
inquiry as part of the thickness examination.
Another set of variables to consider might be the peculiarities of
the market in which the work operates and the need to promote
competition in or entry into that market in order to lower the social
costs of monopoly that are thought to accompany copyright
protection. Professor Christopher Yoo has advocated a model of
copyright law based on the economic theory of product
differentiation, in which he argues that the spatial dimension of the
relevant product market can be an appropriate mechanism for
minimizing copyright’s deadweight losses, and he posits that the
substantial-similarity analysis might be the right way of realizing that
208
objective.
Yoo’s model—deriving from copyright’s utilitarian
ideals—would have to be operationalized through copyright’s
thickness analysis.

206. See Loren, supra note 18, at 36 (arguing that courts should apply “thin” protection to
works based on a comparison of their creative motivation).
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (“In determining whether the use made of a work . . . is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature . . . .”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (finding use presumptively fair because it was of a
noncommercial nature).
208. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212,
27172 (2004).
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The more difficult value to address in this analysis is that of
distributive justice. Distributive goals can of course be rendered
209
compatible with utilitarianism. This compatibility is especially easy
to achieve when the utilitarian calculus is an aggregate one rather
than an individualized determination. In the aggregate formulation,
distributive concerns can be internalized in the idea of social-welfare
210
maximization. As an individualized determination between two
parties, however, distributive justice becomes an ideal to be realized
through interpersonal comparisons and less about incorporating
211
distributive concerns into the utilitarian calculus. Discussions of
distributive values in copyright law often fail to distinguish between
212
the two.
Accepting thickness as copyright’s utilitarian calculus, however,
requires making an important analytical move—namely, going
beyond the focus on the work itself for the analysis. What
characterizes the thickness inquiry in its current formulation, beyond
its use of copyright’s formal devices, is its examination of copyright’s
utilitarian values through the lens of the work and never
213
independently. Expanding the gamut of utilitarian variables in the
inquiry might seem to necessitate abandoning this approach. Mere
analytic dissection, understood in its strict sense, might seem
inadequate if the analysis is to go beyond the work itself. A closer
examination of the ways in which courts approach the task of
analyzing the work today reveals that the change suggested here is
much less drastic than it might seem.
In scrutinizing a work for its copyrightability under existing law,
courts begin with a technique that is described as the “mute
214
testimony” approach—focusing on the work itself for their analysis.
Although the court’s inquiry unquestionably commences with the
work itself, the plaintiff is allowed to introduce additional evidence
about the creative process—the judgments that went into the creation
and the different motivations that were involved—to aid the court in

209. See Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 28793 (2003).
210. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 155, at 2638 (“The choice of a method of
aggregation involves the adoption of a view concerning matters of distribution.”).
211. See id. at 3738.
212. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 189, at 153946.
213. See supra Part I.B.
214. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985);
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980).
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215

its examination of the work. This evidence is then evaluated in
relation to the work itself by the fact finder deciding the issue. Its use
is most commonly seen when courts attempt to determine the
conceptual separability of the aesthetic and useful parts of a work.
The creator is allowed to introduce evidence of the design process
and its connection to the nature of the work so that the court may
216
understand the work in light of the creator’s actions. In practice,
therefore, courts routinely look beyond the four corners of the work
to analyze the work. The utilitarian value-based determination of
copyright’s thickness should thus have little problem extending that
technique here as well.
2. Similarity as Copyright’s Correlative Inquiry. Having set the
thickness for their analysis, courts then move to analyzing the
similarity between the two works, using the standard of scrutiny that
they determine is warranted. The similarity analysis is, however, far
from mechanical. It involves determining whether the defendant’s
copying involved the appropriation of material of “value” and
217
“substance” from the plaintiff’s work. It thus amounts to an
assessment of legal actionability rather than a factual determination
218
of mere boundary crossing of the kind seen in trespass cases. The
leading treatise on substantial similarity makes this abundantly clear
by illustrating the similarity analysis through the law of battery and
noting how it forms the analog to battery’s determination of whether
a defendant’s actions “rise to the level that is a compensable
219
battery.” The similarity analysis thus involves more than just a
reasonless comparison of de facto similarity between the two works
and is structurally imbued with a subjective, normative assessment of
whether the similarity is worthy of liability.
Another way of understanding the similarity analysis is as an
inquiry into the right-duty relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Although it no doubt involves according a work
protection, it does so not in the abstract but only through the

215. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145–46 (2d Cir.
1987).
216. Id.
217. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1.
218. See Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction,
122 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (2009) (“[T]respass makes any volitional boundary crossing
unlawful.”).
219. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 1:1.
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mechanism of liability. This in turn means that its emphasis is on
examining whether the defendant’s actions amount to an actionable
interference with the plaintiff’s protected interest. It is thus structured
in terms of right and duty, a relationship referred to by tort law
220
theorists as the relationship of correlativity.
The idea of correlativity posits that the plaintiff and the
defendant in any liability calculus are connected as “doer” and
“sufferer” of the same injustice, which the liability judgment seeks to
221
correct. The plaintiff’s entitlement is thought to make sense only
when understood in terms of the defendant’s actions and not in the
abstract. As Weinrib points out, “[e]ach party’s position is
222
normatively significant only through the position of the other,” and
never independent of it in a correlative set up. Correlativity is thought
to originate in Aristotle’s idea of corrective justice, represented in
turn in the bipolar relationship between the plaintiff and the
223
defendant in a private-law action. Corrective justice is also different
from distributive justice, which involves sharing the burdens of an
action according to some distributive criterion, be it fairness or
224
something else. The similarity analysis in copyright law gives effect
to precisely this idea of corrective justice.
In asking whether the defendant’s actions were enough to merit
being classified as wrongful and rendered the basis for liability, the
law is in effect requiring the decision maker to undertake an
interpersonal analysis of the parties’ relative positions as manifested
through their works. It is thus emphasizing a scrutiny of the
defendant’s copying relative to the protection that the plaintiff’s right
merits. The abstract basis of this protection is adjudicated in the first
instance, but its relative basis is given effect during the comparison.
Going back to the battery analogy, no one would deny that a plaintiff
has the right to bodily integrity in the abstract, and yet the liability
220. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114–15 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 107, 116–17 (2001).
221. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 110.
222. Id.
223. WEINRIB, supra note 220, at 56; see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, at
120–21 (Martin Ostwald trans., Liberal Arts Press 22d prtg. 1984) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
224. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice,
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000); see also Gregory C.
Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193,
194–95 (2000); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort
as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2006).
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analysis involves determining whether the defendant’s touching is
sufficient enough to be deemed an invasion of that abstract right,
understood in relational terms.
The similarity analysis thus operates as copyright’s correlative
framework, in which the defendant’s actions are examined through
the lens of a right-duty relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Note that one of the enduring features of the correlative
setup is that the defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s right are
225
meant to derive from the same normative account. In other words, a
defendant’s actions are a wrong only because they interfere with a
plaintiff’s right, and the plaintiff’s right, in the relational sense, arises
226
because of the defendant’s wrongdoing. To avoid the trap of an
unending circularity in this formulation, the source of the right-duty
relationship must therefore originate in a foundational value that
227
forms the source of the relationship. Copyright’s welfarist-utilitarian
ideal fails to pass muster here because it represents a “wider principle
that applies to anything whose normative significance is not
228
correlatively structured.” In other words, copyright’s utilitarian
ideal may comport with granting a creator a right, to enhance social
welfare, but it says very little about what shape that right needs to
take and indeed the conditions under which an interference with it is
229
to be considered an actionable injustice. As Weinrib observes in
relation to tort law:
Of course, having a right contributes to a person’s welfare by
protecting some interest from wrongful interference. . . . That,
however, does not mean that rights are synonymous with aspects of
welfare or that their normative significance is to be understood in
terms of it. In the law’s contemplation, the increase in welfare
through having a right and the decrease through the infringement of
230
a right are the consequences rather than the grounds of the right.

This reasoning makes perfect sense in the copyright context.
Were the law’s concern exclusively welfare driven, it might have
225. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 110; see also WEINRIB, supra note 220, at 123 (“When right
and duty operate as correlatives, they constitute an articulated unity.”).
226. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 117.
227. See WEINRIB, supra note 220, at 124.
228. Id. at 112.
229. For a fuller explication of this idea, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative
Structure of Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013).
230. Weinrib, supra note 220, at 120.
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readily abandoned any insistence on copying being necessary to
trigger liability. The answer must therefore be sought in values that
are capable of instantiation in correlative or relational terms. Weinrib
finds the answer—for tort law—to lie not in welfare but in the idea of
231
“personality” or purposiveness in action. The individual actor’s
capacity for purposive action, without regard to specific ends or
purposes, is thought to provide correlativity with its foundational
value, which in turn forms the normative basis of the right-duty
232
relationship that it revolves around.
The question then is whether this logic has any traction in
relation to copyright’s similarity analysis. In applying the correlativity
idea to copyright law, Professor Abraham Drassinower argues that
the logic of purposive action can account for copyright law’s idea233
expression dichotomy and defense of independent creation.
Observing that “[t]he intersubjectivity of copyright is structured as an
irreducible correlativity of legal right and duty,” he argues that
copyright law’s belief in the ideal of equality in authorship explains
234
these doctrinal elements. The defendant and plaintiff are both
considered purposive authors, and consequently the plaintiff’s
entitlement—even though rights-based—is nonetheless limited by the
principal of equality, or the idea that the law needs to leave sufficient
room for each actor to express herself without simultaneously
235
interfering with the expression of others.
Much of the same logic applies to copyright’s analysis of
actionable similarity as well. Recall that the test requires the decision
maker to focus on whether the copying in question took material of
236
“substance” and “value” from the plaintiff’s work. Yet, the fact of
the matter remains that these variables are not necessarily
coterminous with any of copyright’s fundamental filters to
copyrightability—such as the originality requirement, the ideaexpression dichotomy, or indeed the exclusion of utilitarian elements
from protection. Assessing the substance and value of a work thus
involves looking beyond these filters to what makes a work
worthwhile to its creator. All the same, doing so in the general or in
231. Id. at 113–21.
232. Id. at 112.
233. Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2003).
234. Id. at 9, 12.
235. Id. at 12–18.
236. See supra Part I.

BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE NORMATIVITY OF COPYING

10/29/2012 10:51 AM

253

the abstract is often difficult, meaning that the scrutiny will vary from
one class of works to another, and indeed from one individual work
to another even within a single class. The idea of “substance and
value” in a work is often narrowly understood to correlate to a work’s
economic value in the market, with the requirement then understood
as merely one of determining whether the defendant copied
economically valuable portions of a work. Yet, as Nimmer points out,
it is often impossible to determine when the economic value of a work
237
has been sensibly damaged by a defendant’s mere copying.
Indeed, when one traces the origins of the requirement back to
238
Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, it becomes apparent that his use
of the idea of “value” was not meant to direct the scrutiny solely
239
toward the economic effects of the appropriation. As an alternative
to assessing whether the value of a work was “sensibly diminished,”
he also proposed examining whether “the labors of the original
240
author [were] substantially to an injurious extent appropriated.”
First, the emphasis on “sensibly” diminished as part of the inquiry
seems to suggest that the diminution in value needs to be perceivable
to the decision maker in some ways, rather than a mere probabilistic
assessment of the likely impact that the copying will have on the
market for the plaintiff’s work. That this is true is also demonstrated
by the economic inquiry being the gravamen of the independent fairuse doctrine, under which courts are mandated to examine the
241
potential effects of a defendant’s actions on the plaintiff’s market.
To require a court to undertake that examination twice thus makes
little sense. Second, the reference to the labors of the original author
seems to suggest that the focus of the inquiry ought to be on the
reasons why an author considers the work important—since the most

237. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[A][2][a] (“[T]his oft-repeated principle
does not tell the trier of fact when in any given instance the value of the original is sensibly
diminished or injuriously appropriated. The trier must ultimately determine the importance of
that material that is common to both parties’ works.”).
238. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
239. Id. at 346 (reasoning that “[e]ven in compositions confessedly literary, [an] author may
not intend . . . them for publication; and yet, no one on that account doubts his right of property
therein, as a subject of value to himself and to his posterity”).
240. Id. at 348.
241. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . . the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
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labor-intensive parts of a work need not always correspond to the
most economically valuable.
The substance and value examination is thus in effect an inquiry
into the relationship between the author and the work and the question
whether the defendant’s actions amount to an interference with that
relationship. It thus derives from the same concept of
intersubjectivity, except that the focus on equality of authorship and
personality finds emphasis on the plaintiff’s side. The act of producing
a work of creative expression—the act of expressing oneself—is the
focus of the protection at this stage, rather than the consequences or
effects of such expression in the marketplace or beyond. The
intersubjectivity, or interpersonal comparison that the scrutiny
entails, is mediated through the works in question but originates in
the author-work connection that is the basis of the plaintiff’s
entitlement.
The author-work connection that the similarity scrutiny entails
can be understood to be a largely deontological one. Yet, the beauty
of the two-pronged substantial-similarity formulation is that this
consideration influences the functioning of the system only after the
threshold questions of instrumental purpose seen in the thickness
inquiry are satisfied. In other words, the deontological questions
operate not in the abstract but rather purely in the bilateral and
relational setting of comparing the defendant’s actions with the
plaintiff’s.
Viewing the wrongfulness inquiry as a corrective-justice-driven
inquiry deriving from the author-work connection and a defendant’s
interference with it allows room for a set of values that have hitherto
been thought to be incompatible with copyright law in the United
242
States. One such value is corrective justice, which informs the very
normative structure of the rights-based inquiry at this stage of the
analysis. Yet, as some have pointed out, corrective justice does not
independently address the normative content of the right, even
243
though it focuses on the structure through which it is effectuated.
To fill this void, explanations for the right that derive directly
from the author-work connection begin to assume relevance. One

242. See Drassinower, supra note 233, at 3 (observing how rights-based or natural-rightsbased theories of copyright law have little traction in the North American context because the
incentives/utilitarian rationale dominates the landscape).
243. Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REV. 283, 285
(1992).
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such idea here is the labor-based explanation, in which the measure of
wrongfulness focuses on the elements of a work in which the author
has invested greatest time and effort—an idea often traced back to
244
Justice Story. Another alternative is the idea of “moral personality”
found in Kantian accounts of copyright law and thought to lie at the
245
heart of droit d’auteur regimes of protection. Note that this value
would not mean that heightened protection is extended to parts of the
work that represent an author’s individual personality, but rather that
some parts of the work better represent the principle of authorship
and the moral agency that accompanies it; these latter parts are to be
weighed more heavily during the similarity analysis. Nonutilitarian
values thus find recognition in this stage of the inquiry on a relational
basis.
The key point to remember here is that the conception of the
author’s rights at this stage of the inquiry is limited to the relational
setting. Similarity is a relational inquiry, which allows the right-duty
relationship to inform it as a substantive matter. The similarity
inquiry can thus be understood to be rights based only in relational
terms, and not in the consequentialist sense that the idea of a rights246
based approach is often used. The author’s rights argument for
copyright protection is routinely thought of in absolute terms and
247
almost never conceptualized bilaterally. Indeed, by connecting it to
Hegel’s notion of personhood as a justification for property—itself an
absolute interest—the interest comes to be conceptualized in terms
248
analogous to property as a natural-rights-based claim.
Yet
personality, much like other deontological interests, is perfectly
capable of being understood and analyzed in bilateral, relational
244. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). For other labor-based
explanations of copyright law, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1993); and Yen, supra note 189.
245. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1067–68 (2008).
246. For an interesting discussion of the idea of “rights-based” approaches to copyright,
dispelling some of the common mistakes that this entails, see Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’
Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law
Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 553–56 (2006).
247. Indeed, this is manifested in the Copyright Act’s own limited recognition of author’s
rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the
right . . . to claim authorship of that work . . . .”).
248. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–39
(1988); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958–59
(1982).
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terms. The main analytical difference between the two is that
whereas the relational conception is predicated on the identification
and rectification of harm, the absolutist conception is thought to
operate independent of any harm or infraction. The evolution of
privacy as an interest protected by the law independent of property is
250
a good example of the former. The privacy interest came to be
understood and protected by reference to a set of actions that were
designed to protect the right “to be let alone,” which analytically
251
anticipated an invasion. The personality interest can be conceived
of in analogous terms. While it does not form the basis for the
abstract right, it nonetheless remains an important interest that
copyright law seeks to protect relationally against interferences.
A rights-based, correlatively structured similarity analysis might,
on the face of things, be seen as requiring decision makers to
undertake a qualitative, aesthetic judgment of the work, precisely the
kind of inquiry that Justice Holmes is known to have cautioned
against in his formulation of copyright’s nondiscrimination principle
252
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. On closer examination,
though, the fact that the similarity analysis is structured as a purely
factual inquiry—relegated to the jury whenever possible—actually
sits well with Justice Holmes’s admonition. Because the assessment is
253
not made by “persons trained only to the law,” —that is, judges,
except when sitting in their capacity as fact finders—the similarity
analysis in this formulation remains perfectly compliant with the nondiscrimination principle. Additionally, Holmes’ concerns about
discriminating between different works seemed to stem from the
binary structure of the inquiry he was presented with in that
254
casenamely, whether the work was entitled to protection or not.
Because the similarity inquiry here is structured in relational terms, it
works less as a denial of all protection to a work and more as a
situational determination of liability, perhaps reducing the rigor of
Justice Holmes’ concerns.

249.
(2010).
250.
(1890).
251.
252.
253.
254.

See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 146–47
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
Id. at 195.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
Id. at 251.
See id.
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Understanding the similarity inquiry as deriving from copyright’s
nonutilitarian values also explains why this stage of the substantialsimilarity examination consciously avoids relying on expert
255
testimony. Determining which parts of a work demonstrate a
greater connection to the author’s agency, and whether the
defendant’s actions interfere with it, is entirely a question of
subjective judgment, peculiar to the work and authors in question.
Expert testimony is therefore unlikely to be particularly helpful given
the individualized comparison that this task involves. Far more useful
to the determination is evidence about the author’s creative process,
256
something that is routinely introduced to aid the analysis.
3. Justifying the Sequencing. Separating the utilitarian and
personality-based goals of copyright law in substantial similarity’s
two-step analysis allows courts to order the introduction of these
incommensurables into the adjudicative process. Yet, conceptual
sequencing is different from conceptual ordering. The process thus
has to account not just for the separation of the inquiry but also for
257
the particular sequence in which the variables are considered. In
other words, it needs to be able to explain why it is that substantial
similarity does not begin with the personality ideal and then look to
its utilitarian goals in the second step.
Appreciating the rationale behind the sequence necessitates
getting to the bottom of copyright law’s normative foundations.
Unlike its civil-law counterparts, in which the connection between an
author and the work is thought to generate an inalienable right that is
258
natural—in the sense of being nonpositive in its origin —AngloAmerican copyright law views the source of the author’s entitlement
259
to be rooted entirely within positive law. In contrast to laws that
create wrongs in relation to prestatutory interests such as tort or
antidiscrimination law, the copyright statute both identifies the four
corners of the interest it protects and delineates actions that it treats

255. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). But see Lemley, supra note 15, at
29–30.
256. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146 (2d Cir.
1987).
257. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1505 (“A conceptually sequenced argument might
provide a quite different sort of ordering for decisionmaking from that provided by a value
ordering.”).
258. See Monta, supra note 28, at 178.
259. See id.

BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

258

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/29/2012 10:51 AM

[Vol. 62:203

260

as interferences with that interest. The copyright statute’s grant of
exclusive rights thus exhausts the gamut of the creator’s rights under
261
United States copyright law. And because the statute’s primary—if
262
not exclusive—purpose lies in its utilitarian, welfare-based ideal, the
recognition or grant of an interest originates there. The personality
interest is, in other words, worthy of recognition only if the
fundamental utilitarian purpose is realized. Without a fundamental
utilitarian purpose being served, the investment of personality into
creative expression is simply not worthy of protection. This is in
contrast to other areas of the law, such as tort law and criminal law, in
which the positive legal regime is trying to protect rights and interests
that are prepositive—which in turn accounts for why any conceptual
sequencing in adjudicating claims in those contexts begins with the
263
right and then introduces utilitarian considerations.
This argument treats the institution of copyright as a positive
construct and the wrongfulness of copying as devoid of any
independent moral connotations. In other words, expressive copying
264
is wrong because the law treats it as such. Indeed, this positivist
approach to copyright law has been a mainstay of the American
tradition, manifested in the language of the Constitution’s Copyright
Clause, and formed the basis of the law’s rejection of the idea of
265
“common law copyright” for works covered by the statute. To the
extent that notions of moral wrongfulness or the like enter the
equation, they do so entirely on terms determined by the law and
never independent of it.
In following the sequence that it does, substantial similarity thus
allows copyright law to prioritize the good over the right. The conflict
between the good and the right has long remained at the center of the
debate between utilitarianism and other deontologically oriented
266
approaches. The ideal of the good represents a commitment to

260. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
only rights that exist under copyright law are those granted by statute.”).
261. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (“Congress, then, by this act,
[Act of 1790,] instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.”).
262. See sources cited supra note 159.
263. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1512–20.
264. For more on the general idea of a legal wrong and its significance as a matter of
positivism, see generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 141.
265. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 661–62.
266. See generally DAVID ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (2002); John Rawls, The
Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988).
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consequences of a certain kind, whereas the ideal of the right
represents the belief that there remains an unconditional or
categorical moral virtue in actions or decisions that can and should be
267
divorced from their consequences. Whereas deontology emphasizes
the priority of the right over the good, utilitarianism does just the
268
opposite—by prioritizing the good over the right. In adhering to the
two-step sequence, copyright law can be seen to be following its
foundational utilitarian purpose.
The inquiry’s prioritization of the good over the right via a
sequenced ordering of considerations should not, however, be taken
to imply that the ideas of the right and the good are somehow
converted into neat, watertight categories as a functional matter.
Indeed, one of the earliest criticisms of Kant’s theory of the
“categorical imperative,” in which he posited the superiority of the
right over the good, was attacked precisely for its inability to
demarcate the practical basis for the right independent of assessments
269
of the good. One thus should not expect the demarcation to become
any clearer in copyright law just because the order is now reversed. If
anything, the normative purity of the rights-based account is likely to
be diluted as a result of the sequenced ordering, since the rights-based
considerations are instantiated within a very limited domain.
For copyright, though, this should be viewed as more of a benefit
than a cost. Instead of letting rights-based considerations have
unbounded importance during the decision-making process—which in
turn might run afoul of the Constitution’s strong utilitarian
mandate—conceptual sequencing limits their operation to the
correlative domain, in the process forcing them to operate within the
utilitarian framework of the institution. In so doing, it no doubt gives
them a distinctively utilitarian purpose, something that even the most
ardent supporters of rights-based considerations in copyright law
acknowledge as necessary to ensure the system’s compliance with the
270
Constitution.
* * *
Reconceptualizing copyright’s substantial-similarity analysis as a
conceptually sequenced ordering of plural considerations in the

267. Charles Larmore, The Right and the Good, 20 PHILOSOPHIA 15, 15–16 (1990).
268. See GERASIMOS SANTAS, GOODNESS AND JUSTICE: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND THE
MODERNS 155 (2001).
269. See Larmore, supra note 267, at 19.
270. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 191, at 1991.
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infringement analysis reveals how copyright law is able to successfully
accommodate both utilitarian and rights-based considerations.
Instead of forcing the analysis to lexically prioritize one set of
concerns over the other, or to balance them in some kind of direct
tradeoff, it allows courts to restrict the prioritization to the temporal
sequence and then give each set of concerns adequate attention at
different stages of the inquiry.
Copyright’s dominant explanatory theory is today no doubt
utilitarian, according to which the institution exists principally to
induce the production of creative works at minimal social cost via the
271
market. Yet, much like the economic explanation for tort law, this
utilitarian account of copyright law is hard-pressed to explain
copyright’s intrinsic bipolarity constraint: the reality that the privatelaw-based plaintiff-defendant structure represents its chosen vehicle
272
to realize its utilitarian goals. If tort law is entirely about ensuring
efficient deterrence, why tie a plaintiff’s recovery to actual harm,
rather than the level of deterrence necessary? In a similar vein, if
copyright law is entirely about inducing creativity by allowing
plaintiff-creators to recover for copying, why limit the recovery to the
harm from a defendant’s copying rather than the optimal inducement
273
necessary for creation? Indeed in copyright law, we might even go
one step further and ask why the system should emphasize copying at
all, instead of carving out a market monopoly for the creator. This
bipolarity constraint is thought to represent the fact that copyright
law, much like tort law, represents a private-law institution
274
attempting to further public-oriented goals.
Consequently, its
explanatory and functional accounts need to remain sensitive to both
275
the public-purpose and private-law dimensions. The sequenced
introduction of utilitarian and rights-based values through substantial
similarity is an important way by which this accommodation is
achieved.

271. See Balganesh, supra note 156, at 1577–78 (“Copyright, it is argued, exists to provide
creators with an incentive to create and disseminate their works publicly.”).
272. See PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 11–12 (1997); JULES L. COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY
13 (2001). For a fuller discussion of bipolarity and its connection to broader public goals, see
Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 811–13 (2008).
273. Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1168–70.
274. See Balganesh, supra note 229, at 20; Dagan, supra note 272, at 813 (making a similar
claim about private law generally).
275. Balganesh, supra note 229, at 23.

BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/29/2012 10:51 AM

THE NORMATIVITY OF COPYING

261

III. THE BENEFITS OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
Having seen how substantial similarity embodies an
underappreciated structural dimension of the copyright entitlement
and allows utilitarian and rights-based considerations to enter into the
infringement analysis, we now move to identifying the benefits that
are likely to flow from it. The advantages that are likely to accrue to
the copyright system from this process are both formal and
substantive. This Part identifies and discusses three such benefits of
this analytical process: (i) it is likely to result in courts and judges
exhibiting a greater degree of candor and forthrightness about the
values that they are seeking to instantiate in the functioning of
copyright law; (ii) it enables the bifurcation of copyright law’s
guidance for upstream and downstream actors; and (iii) it will allow
the fair-use doctrine to focus on considerations unique to the
defendant’s actions, the core of a “defense.”
A. Fine Tuning Copyright’s Upstream and Downstream Guidance
As an incentive mechanism for creativity, copyright law is
concerned with guiding behavior. Its promise of limited market
exclusivity is thought to guide behavior by encouraging the very
276
production of new creative works among authors. Yet, this promise
represents only one side of the story. As a mechanism of liability,
copyright law is also about signaling to potential defendants the range
277
of behavior that will be tolerated before liability is imposed. It thus
operates as an incentive not just for independent creativity but also
for sequential or derivative creativity, in which defendants use and
copy protected work in producing their own works. The distinction
between the two incentive effects may usefully be characterized as
278
“upstream” and “downstream,” respectively.
Copyright’s upstream-guidance function seems to pose few
problems in practice. Its promise of some protection for minimal
amounts of creativity in expression forms a fairly robust signal to

276. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984)
(“Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce
their works, they are given an incentive to create . . . .”).
277. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, (1994) (“Because copyright law ultimately
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is
peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as
possible.”).
278. Balganesh, supra note 142, at 69.
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potential creators. On the downstream side, though, copyright’s
guidance for potential defendants has long been known to be
problematic. Despite its being copyright’s principal safety valve, the
cost-benefit analysis that fair use entails is often largely
279
unpredictable. This in turn contributes to a significant degree of risk
aversion, stifling what may be otherwise socially productive forms of
280
using the protected work. A sequenced ordering of copyright’s goals
through the substantial-similarity inquiry is likely to go some distance
in alleviating this concern and in further fine tuning copyright’s
upstream incentives.
The second part of the substantial-similarity inquiry—the
similarity analysis—can be seen as generating a distinct set of
relational directives aimed exclusively at potential defendants—or,
downstream creators. Unlike simple directives that operate in the
nature of abstract prohibitions on certain kinds of conduct, for
example, do not speed, relational directives are aimed at specific
individuals, in an effort to protect their legal interests, for example,
281
do not injure X. Tort law is said to consist of relational directives
that impose relational legal duties on individuals to act or refrain
282
from acting in a certain way.
It is crucial to appreciate the idea of a relational directive and to
distinguish it from its simplistic characterization as a liability rule in
283
the Calabresi-Melamed framework. The law’s mere imposition of
liability for certain actions does not imply that individuals do not view
themselves as being under an obligation to obey the law. In other
words, individuals are very often motivated to comply with the law

279. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483,
1491–1502 (2007).
280. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1092–1122 (2007)
(“While the doctrine’s attention to context has many salutary attributes, it is so case-specific
that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet
users, and others who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to communicate
effectively.”).
281. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 59–60 (1998).
282. For more on the idea of relational directives and their significance in tort law, see id. at
59–60; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 141, at 945–46.
283. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (“Whenever
someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined
value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”).

BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE NORMATIVITY OF COPYING

10/29/2012 10:51 AM

263
284

because it is the law and it speaks to them as a set of directives. In
pioneering work, Professor Dale Nance showed how the simplified
understanding of all tort law as liability rules failed to capture this
distinction, which he classified as the distinction between “guidance
285
rules” and “enforcement rules.” Whereas enforcement rules are
directed at recalcitrant actors, guidance rules are directed at
individuals who seek to order their lives to remain in compliance with
286
the law. Thus the tort laws of battery or fraud no doubt remain
structured as regimes of liability for certain actions, yet one would be
hard-pressed to argue that they do not generate relational directives
to individuals not to perform those actions. So it is with copyright too.
Although it is no doubt a regime of liability, copyright’s emphasis
on copying operates as a relational directive to potential copiers. And
the source of that relational directive originates in the similarity phase
of the substantial-similarity analysis. By consciously refraining from
rendering all forms of copying actionable, the analysis directs
individuals to refrain from copying another’s protected expression
only when it amounts to an interference with that person’s interests,
which the similarity analysis in turn identifies in terms of the
287
“substance” and “essence” of a work. By identifying the plaintiff’s
right in terms of the substance and essence of the work, the
substantial-similarity analysis imposes its correlative duty as a
relational directive on potential copiers.
One may wonder whether the relational directive communicated
by the similarity analysis reduces the indeterminacy of the
entitlement in any significant way at all. In practice, it indeed does—
over time. In applying the similarity analysis to individual cases,
courts have come to recognize that the substance and essence of
different categories of works—those that are capable of taking color
from rights-based considerations—are likely manifested in certain
288
specific parts of the protected expression. For instance, in relation

284. Zipursky, supra note 281, at 58. For a detailed explication of this idea in copyright law.
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the
Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1674 (2012).
285. Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral,
83 VA. L. REV. 837, 861 (1997).
286. Id. at 858.
287. See supra Part I.C.
288. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, §§ 4:1–4.9 (“The evaluation of the total
concept and feel of the works at issue generally is an assessment of the protected expression
revealed by examination of the seven concrete elements.”).
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to literary and dramatic works of fiction, courts have over time come
to focus on seven different factors to assess the substance and
essence: plot and sequence of events, dialogue, characters, theme,
289
mood, setting, and pace. Similarly, for sculptures with human forms,
the analysis tends to emphasize the portrayal of the human form, such
as facial features and expression, in determining the essence of the
290
work.
None of this, to be sure, comes close to the certainty that might
be offered by a bright-line rule. Yet it marks a major improvement
over the guidance directives of fair use in two important respects.
First, unlike the fair-use doctrine, the focus here remains on the
works themselves rather than surrounding circumstances that may
have no bearing on the creative process. A large part of the
uncertainty surrounding fair use originates in these variables that are
disconnected from the work itself, for example, market harm,
291
potential market, purpose, and so forth. Second, in contrast to fair
use, the similarity analysis is frozen in time and fixed at the point in
time that the work was created. Consequently, the predictive element
that the similarity inquiry entails is static, unlike in the fair use
context in which it is dynamic and capable of significant variation
292
over time.
Additionally, the thickness determination also serves to fine tune
copyright’s upstream incentive structure for creators. By granting
greater protection to works that better serve copyright’s utilitarian
goals, the thickness requirement—at least in theory—sends a signal to
creators to ensure that their works meet these goals in order to obtain
maximally thick protection. It thus creates an incentive to be more
creative, to produce more expressive—as opposed to ideational—
content, and indeed to better meet any additional requirements that
293
courts might introduce into the utilitarian calculus.

289. Id. § 4:1; see also Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 297 (6th Cir. 2004);
Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Lindhein, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1990).
290. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 13, § 10:3.
291. See Carroll, supra note 280, at 1101–06.
292. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 787–88 (2003).
293. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 91, at 1534 (making a similar claim in relation to
a tiered system of originality).
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B. Candor and Clarity in Copyright Reasoning
In innumerable copyright-infringement suits, courts routinely
confront a dilemma: on the one hand, it often is not clear that the
plaintiff’s work deserves full protection under copyright law. At the
same time, though, the defendant’s act of copying is palpably
egregious: willful, anticompetitive, or a verbatim reproduction of the
plaintiff’s work in its entirety. In these situations, two of which are
discussed below, denying the plaintiff all protection would fail to
communicate the law’s disapproval of the defendant’s actions. But
simply finding the defendant’s actions to constitute infringement
might have the effect of according the plaintiff’s work more
protection than it merits.
Copyright’s binary mechanisms only serve to exacerbate this
dilemma. The idea of copyrightability, even when measured through
its various components such as originality or the idea-expression
294
dichotomy, is often viewed as an all-or-nothing determination.
Additionally, the tendency among courts to view the copyright
entitlement entirely in its abstract, nonrelational formulation also
contributes to this. Copyright’s entitlement is perceived to be
attached exclusively to the work and rarely ever as equally influenced
by the bipolar or correlative structure of the claim. Thus, in
attempting to balance these competing concerns, courts are invariably
forced to draw artificial distinctions or to create categories that run
counter to copyright law’s core principles. Two prominent
infringement cases best illustrate this phenomenon and how the
courts’ uses of substantial similarity might have allowed each court to
engage in significantly less idiosyncratic reasoning to reach its
conclusion.
The first of these was a case decided by the Seventh Circuit,
295
American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n. The plaintiff
association in the case had created a comprehensive code of dental
procedures and nomenclatures. The code contained an encyclopedic
index of all dental procedures and assigned each procedure a unique
296
short description, a long description, and a number. The defendant
association, which had participated in the creation of the plaintiff’s
code, eventually created its own index of procedures, and in so doing

294. See supra notes 196–197.
295. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
296. Id. at 977–78.
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copied the descriptions—both long and short—and numbers from the
297
Unhappy with this copying, the plaintiff
plaintiff’s work.
298
commenced a copyright-infringement action against the defendant.
The district court concluded that the plaintiff’s code was
299
uncopyrightable.
Finding that it lacked any “modicum” of
creativity, the court focused on the code’s utilitarian nature to
conclude that it lost any semblance of originality once the form of the
300
work was separated from its function. Recognizing that copyright
law contained no explicit rule disallowing protection for utilitarian
literary expression analogous to its rule denying protection to useful
designs, the court used copyright’s admittedly vague “originality”
301
requirement to reach a similar conclusion.
On appeal, Judge Frank Easterbrook took exception to this
approach, which he viewed as conflating originality with
302
functionality. His majority opinion began by setting out the absurd,
economically disastrous consequences that would result from the
denial of protection to works simply because they were functional in
303
nature. Finding that there was indeed some amount of creativity in
the plaintiff’s classification of dental procedures, he concluded that all
304
three components of the plaintiff’s work were indeed copyrightable.
An obvious undertone in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, however,
is his emphasis on the amount of work and effort that went into the
plaintiff’s code and on the robust market that exists for taxonomic
works of the same nature. After detailing the various kinds of costintensive, economically valuable taxonomies that exist in the market,
he went to some pains to argue that “[c]lassification is a creative
endeavor,” that the plaintiff’s choices in its classification weren’t
dictated by logic, and that “[c]reativity marks the expression” even
305
after these choices were made. Indeed, at one point in his
description of the plaintiff’s choices, he noted how “[b]lood is shed in
the [plaintiff’s] committees” over the choice of how to describe a
297. Id.
298. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, No. 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494 (N.D.
Ill. May 1, 1996), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
299. Id. at *17.
300. Id. at *9–17.
301. Id. at *8–9.
302. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 980.
303. Id. at 978–79.
304. Id. at 979.
305. Id.
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procedure. Intriguingly, he went on to draw a distinction between a
“taxonomy” and a “compilation,” arguing that the former contains
materials that are incapable of existing independently, unlike the
latter, and he rejected the argument that a taxonomy is an
unprotectible “system,” noting instead that it is capable of being put
307
to multiple uses.
Clearly important to Judge Easterbrook then was the fact that
the defendant was a competitor of the plaintiff’s, rendering its actions
anticompetitive in market terms, and the reality that the plaintiff had
invested a good deal of effort and thought into its work, even if all of
it wasn’t apparent on the face on the work itself. Yet explicitly
acknowledging either of these concerns would have been
problematic. Anticompetitive concerns are given no special emphasis
in copyright law, and the plaintiff’s efforts alone render the work no
more worthy of protection after Feist’s rejection of a “sweat of the
308
brow” approach to copyrightability.
In reality though, both the lower-court and appellate-court
opinions are equally disingenuous. Whereas the district court had
consciously conflated originality and functionality, the Seventh
Circuit chose to conflate originality with effort and used it as a proxy
for market consequences. Yet both courts were seemingly troubled by
the binary nature of the originality determination. To conclude that
the work was indeed original was problematic to the district court in
light of there being no infusion of “personal taste or judgment” by an
309
individual author. But finding that there was no originality seemed
just as problematic to the Seventh Circuit, from a purely
consequentialist point of view, in light of the effects it might have had
on the market for such indices and taxonomies—which Judge
Easterbrook chose to place great emphasis on as a descriptive matter
310
in his opinion. Both approaches to copyright reasoning were in
some sense, then, dictated by the outcome that the court wanted to
reach in the case.
Had either court focused its attention on the substantialsimilarity analysis and the conceptually sequenced structure that the

306. Id.
307. Id. at 980.
308. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
309. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494, at *15
(N.D. Ill. 1996), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
310. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 979–80.
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analysis represents, it might have gone a long way in alleviating their
respective concerns and perhaps rendering their respective reasoning
less convoluted. This is not to imply that if both courts had focused on
substantial similarity they would have reached the same conclusion.
Rather, it would have brought their real concerns to the forefront of
their analyses instead of masking them behind faux formalism. The
district court’s concern was that the plaintiff’s work, the taxonomy,
was not sufficiently creative, even though it had been copied in large
311
measure (indeed, at times verbatim) by the defendant. The Seventh
Circuit was, on the other hand, more concerned by the egregious
nature of the copying, which appeared to be nothing more than the
defendant free riding on the plaintiff’s labor-intensive efforts. Instead
of forcing the work to be classified in a binary way as either original
or unoriginal, substantial similarity—in its thickness determination—
would have had both courts focus on how original the work was,
independent of the defendant’s copying. Here, it remains likely that
both courts might have found the work to be minimally original and
therefore entitled to very “thin” protection. This in turn would have
312
set the standard of scrutiny for the similarity analysis at its strictest.
Yet, the facts revealed that the works were virtually identical, with
313
the copying being very extensive. The district court opinion
314
described the copying as “striking.” The copying was of the most
labor-intensive parts of the work—its essence and value—giving
effect to Judge Easterbrook’s concerns about protecting the plaintiff’s
315
“endeavor” as well.
The effect of this sequenced and partitioned approach would
have been that the plaintiff’s taxonomy obtained minimal protection
against copying but certainly protection against anticompetitive
copying, which forms the focus of the standard of scrutiny under thin
copyright protection. Both the district and appellate courts might
have had their concerns addressed—and explicitly so—in the process.
A second case involves the merger doctrine, which also operates
principally in binary terms. Either the idea and expression in a work
are merged and the work is denied all protection, or the two are not

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Am. Dental, 1996 WL 224494, at *8–9.
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
Am. Dental, 1996 WL 224494, at *4–5.
Id. at *4.
Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 978–79.
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316

In Kregos v.
merged and the work obtains full protection.
317
Associated Press, the plaintiff had created a form comprising
various statistics on baseball pitchers, which the defendant was
318
alleged to have copied in its own similar forms. The district court
found for the defendant, and concluded that the plaintiff’s work was
insufficiently original and creative to qualify for protection and that
the idea and expression had “merged” in the work, which rendered it
319
unprotectible under the merger doctrine. On appeal, the Second
Circuit disagreed with the district court on both grounds. First, it
found that the plaintiff’s selection of statistics to include in its form
320
was sufficiently creative to meet the Feist standard. On the issue of
the merger doctrine however, the court adopted something of a
midway approach.
On the one hand, the court was confronted with the argument
that the plaintiff’s creative selection of statistical data represented its
321
idea, and not its expression. The district court had found the
plaintiff’s idea to be “an outcome predictive pitching form,” which
322
had merged with the expression in the actual form. The Second
Circuit chose to construct the plaintiff’s idea in more abstract terms,
and in the process found there to be multiple ways of expressing the
idea—overcoming the merger doctrine. All the same, in abstracting to
a higher level of generality, the court worried that it was in effect
according protection to the plaintiff’s idea, theoretical distinctions
323
aside. To overcome this, it then chose to distinguish between
different kinds of ideas: those involving “matters of taste and
personal opinion” and those that are more mundane, or run-of-the324
mill. In relation to the former, it concluded that the costs of
overprotection were minimal—because the idea was in some sense
original—and therefore of less concern under the merger doctrine. In
essence, the court created a new category of “original ideas” that

316. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.03[B][3].
317. Kregos v. Associated Press, 731 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
318. Id. at 114–16.
319. Id. at 119.
320. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1991).
321. Id. at 706.
322. Kregos, 731 F. Supp. at 119.
323. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706–07.
324. Id.
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could now obtain protection despite the merger doctrine. Other
courts have since built on this classification and extended it to new
326
contexts.
Undoubtedly, the Second Circuit’s concerns were legitimate. On
the one hand, characterizing the plaintiff’s contribution as an idea
would result in it being denied protection, despite the reality that the
plaintiff had in some sense invested his own personality into the work
and which the defendant had seemingly copied. Denying it protection
would thus legitimate the defendant’s copying of what was original to
the plaintiff, even if in the realm of ideas. On the other hand,
according it full protection ran the risk of neglecting the merger
doctrine, which had strong roots in copyright’s utilitarian concern
327
with minimizing monopoly costs.
Once again, a focus on substantial similarity might have
alleviated these concerns to a large degree and avoided the creation
of an altogether new category, which now at least on the face of
things pits the idea-expression dichotomy and the originality
requirements at odds with each other, even though they both
originate in the same set of utilitarian concerns. The court might have
begun with the understanding that the work was entitled to a “highly
discerning” standard of protection because it consisted of original and
nonoriginal material and indeed its idea and expression were far from
being clearly distinguishable. Adopting this standard of scrutiny
would have protected the work against copying by the defendant if
such copying was shown to be of the most qualitatively significant and
protectible parts of the work, which the plaintiff would have had little
problem establishing. The defendant’s copying had extended to parts
of the workthe selection and coordinationthat had been infused
with the plaintiff’s own “taste and personal opinion,” which according
to the court represented the most valuable parts of the plaintiff’s
328
work. Indeed, the court might have even found the defendant’s
copying to be so extensive as to satisfy the heightened standard of
scrutiny under the standard of “thin” protection.

325. Id.
326. See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 70–73
(2d Cir. 1994).
327. See supra note 192.
328. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
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Interestingly enough, after remand, both the district court and
330
the court of appeals adopted precisely this approach, and focused
their analyses on the defendant’s substantial similarity. Although
neither court made explicit reference to the thickness of the plaintiff’s
entitlement in the compilation, the concept of thickness seems
pervasive in both opinions. On remand, the district court began by
noting the defendant’s concession that one of its works was “virtually
identical” to the plaintiff’s—a likely allusion to the thin copyright
331
doctrine. In relation to the other work, the court decided to
examine the existence of the requisite “legal similarity” between the
two works, and on dissecting the work and weighing its parts
differently, that is, applying a discerning standard, found for the
defendant because the similarity, if any, related entirely to the
332
unprotectible parts of the work. Somewhat surprisingly, on appeal
333
from this decision, the Second Circuit affirmed. The “unease” that
334
had motivated its creation of a new category in its previous opinion
had now—with the focus shifting from the absolute copyrightability
of the plaintiff’s work to the relative wrongfulness of the copying—
disappeared altogether.
Both these cases together reveal how the substantial-similarity
analysis is capable of balancing the competing concerns that courts
routinely encounter in a copyright dispute, principally as a result of
the dispute’s bilateral structure. A more extensive use of substantial
similarity is thus likely to imbue the copyright decision-making
process with a significantly greater degree of candor than before.
C. Streamlining Fair Use
An increased reliance on substantial similarity by courts is also
likely to indirectly streamline the fair-use doctrine and introduce a
measure of coherence into its operation. Although it remains
copyright’s primary safety valve, fair use is routinely described by
335
courts and scholars as copyright law’s “most troublesome” doctrine.
329. Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir.
1993).
330. Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993).
331. Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1332.
332. Id. at 1332–34.
333. Kregos, 3 F.3d at 663–64.
334. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
335. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984); Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
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Fair use originated as an equitable rule of reason that vested a good
degree of discretion in courts to relax the stringency of the copyright
336
entitlement whenever circumstances demanded. Yet, in due course
it came to be understood as an affirmative defense, the burden for
337
which lay with the defendant.
Accordingly, in a copyrightinfringement suit, the plaintiff is expected to establish the
requirements of a prima facie case without any mention of fair use,
after which the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
338
copying ought to be classified as fair use. On the face of things, fair
use seems to introduce an additional layer of defeasibility into the
copyright entitlement—along the lines of the common law’s
339
traditional rules on pleadings and presumptions.
The problem, however, is that the fair-use determination—at
least as codified today—makes use of factors and variables that are
legitimately examined as part of the substantial-similarity
340
determination. This sits rather oddly with its structure as an
affirmative defense. If fair use is indeed no more than a defense to
infringement—implying that it only ever enters the picture after a
prima facie entitlement is found to exist for the plaintiff and the
defendant specifically invokes it—then having courts reconsider some
of the same issues that they did under their preliminary analysis of the
341
entitlement seems highly redundant and palpably illogical.
The second and third fair-use factors are prime examples of this
problem. The second factor requires courts to examine the “nature of
the copyrighted work,” while the third asks them to consider “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
342
copyrighted work as a whole.” To this day, few courts have used the
343
second factor in any meaningful way. They instead use it to
summarily differentiate between purely factual and creative works,
but then go on to place little weight on the factor in the overall
344
analysis. In functional terms, this factor continues to remain the

336.
337.
§ 13.05.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3,
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, §§ 13.01, 13.05.
See Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1973).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996).
17 U.S.C. § 107(2)–(3).
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][2][a].
Id.
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least useful. What is interesting is that the thickness prong of the
substantial-similarity inquiry has courts ask the exact same question
345
as part of the prima facie case. The difference is that there, unlike in
fair use, courts actually attach consequences, that is, the application
346
of the appropriate standard of scrutiny, to their conclusion.
Although the third fair-use factor does have some functional
significance, its overlap with the substantial-similarity inquiry is
pervasive. Recall that the similarity analysis requires courts to
examine the quantity and quality of the defendant’s copying in light
347
of the copyrighted work as a whole. Yet this is exactly the inquiry
348
demanded by the third fair-use factor. Recognizing this, the
Eleventh Circuit has tried to restructure the inquiry as an
examination of “whether the amount taken is reasonable in light of
349
the purpose of the use and the likelihood of market substitution.”
Unsatisfactorily, this formulation does little more than redirect the
third factor toward the first and fourth factors—producing a
redundancy within the fair-use factors themselves!
One solution to this overlap is to collapse fair use into the
adjudication of the prima facie entitlement and to place the burden
350
for it on the plaintiff—an idea that some have suggested before.
Given that this development is highly unlikely in light of the position
351
that both Congress and the Supreme Court have taken on the issue,
a more pragmatic approach lies instead in streamlining the fair-use
inquiry by having it focus on variables and elements for which the
defendant is indeed best positioned to bear the burden. Leaving aside
for a moment the issue of the overlap between fair use and substantial
similarity, an additional problem in the structure of the second and
third fair-use factors lies in its requiring the defendant to introduce

345. Id. § 13.05[A][4]; see also supra Part I.B.
346. See supra Part I.B.
347. See supra Part I.B.
348. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][3].
349. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1314 n.30 (11th Cir. 2008).
350. For previous suggestions along these lines, see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3,
§ 12.11[F]; Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 969, 1028 (2007) (“Under the harm-based approach to fair use . . . the plaintiff should bear
the burden in such cases to prove that such harm has occurred or is likely to occur.”); Harry N.
Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 790, 801 (1975).
351. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 102836, at 3 n.3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555 n.3.
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evidence on issues about which the plaintiff holds all the information.
The nature of the copyrighted work—if understood as an
examination of the originality or creativity inherent in the work—
entails examining, among other things, the creative process involved
in the production of the work. Similarly, the substantiality of the work
as a portion of the copyrighted work as a whole is a question about
the essence or heart of the copyrighted work, which the defendant
may know very little about. It is inefficient and unproductive to have
the defendant bear the burden of gathering information in the first
instance about the plaintiff’s actions, simply as a procedural matter.
Thus, in addition to the issue of redundancy, the second and third
fair-use factors remain grossly inefficient, given the information
asymmetry between the plaintiff and the defendant on the matters
being examined.
One way for fair use to remain an affirmative defense, while
simultaneously avoiding the redundancies and inefficiencies identified
above, is to have it share its role with substantial similarity. The
second fair-use factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—
performs no meaningful role in the fair-use analysis, even when the
352
factor is found to weigh in favor of the defendant. Yet, it is precisely
the nature of the work on which the thickness prong of the
substantial-similarity analysis focuses. And there, as we noted, it is
routinely translated into a meaningful outcome: namely, a variation in
the standard of scrutiny fixed for the similarity analysis. Courts
applying the substantial-similarity analysis might thus legitimately
ignore the second fair-use factor altogether, recognizing that all of
what it constitutes is undertaken during the thickness analysis—
353
something that courts already do more-or-less expressly. The third
fair-use factor can in turn be converted into a meaningful mechanism
for courts to assess the extent to which the defendant relies on the
copyrighted work in producing its own work. In other words, the third
factor might be used to measure the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the protected work used in relation to the defendant’s
354
work as a whole. This move would allow the court to contextualize
352. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, §13.05[A][2][a].
353. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (observing how the second factor is not of much
help when the copying is of an expressive work); FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 579–80 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
354. For an example of a court actually using the factor this way, see the Second Circuit’s
opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir.
1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). For a fuller discussion, see infra Part IV.B.3.
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the defendant’s copying within the broader context and purpose of
the copying, precisely along the lines alluded to by the Tenth
355
Circuit. It would also in the process emphasize the idea, routinely
operationalized by courts, that in some situations even the copying of
356
a protected work in its entirety may constitute fair use. Looking to
the defendant’s work in its entirety as a denominator for the inquiry
would cause courts to instantiate this principle more fully on a regular
basis.
In turn, this structural bifurcation is likely to result in a more
equitable and efficient sharing of burdens between the plaintiff and
the defendant in copyright-infringement claims. It would also ensure
that courts pay sufficient attention to both parties’ works rather than
just the plaintiff’s. The thickness inquiry would have courts focus only
on the plaintiff’s work, the similarity analysis on a comparison of the
two works, and the fair-use inquiry exclusively on the defendant’s
work and the values that it implicates. Although this streamlining will
not eliminate all of the confusion that today surrounds fair use, it will
at the very least serve to provide a fair bit of structural integrity to the
fair-use doctrine, something that it currently lacks altogether.
IV. THE SEQUENCED SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ANALYSIS IN
ACTION
Having examined the structure of substantial similarity as a
mechanism of entitlement delineation and analyzed its virtues, this
Part illustrates its functioning of substantial similarity by applying it
to a landmark copyright law case decided by the Supreme Court,
357
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises. In the decadeand-a-half since it was handed down, Harper & Row has come to be
understood as having adopted an excessively narrow, market-oriented
358
approach to fair use. Scholars have struggled to make sense of the
competing concerns that seemed to motivate the Court’s fair-use and
359
free-speech reasoning. In this Part, I argue that the real failure in
355. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
356. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][3].
357. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
358. See, e.g., NETANEL, supra note 1, at 64 (“[T]he Court adopted a crabbed, decidedly
property-centered view of fair use.”).
359. See, e.g., id. at 64–65; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 395–96
(1999); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1789 (1988).

BALGANESH IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

276

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/29/2012 10:51 AM

[Vol. 62:203

Harper & Row was architectural. The Court’s fundamental problem
lay in its focusing on fair use as the copyright entitlement’s exclusive
safety valve. Had it understood the entitlement to be a multilayered
defeasible one—along the lines suggested in this Article—its
reasoning would have been more streamlined, and its real motivations
would have become more apparent. This is hardly to suggest simply
that by employing the substantial-similarity analysis the Court would
have necessarily reached a different result. It is very likely that the
final outcome of the case would have remained the same—but for
more cogent and defensible reasons.
A. Moving Beyond Fair Use in Harper & Row
The facts of Harper & Row are well known to any student of
copyright law. President Gerald Ford had authored a memoir, titled
360
A Time to Heal, for which he entered into a publishing agreement
with the plaintiffs, Harper & Row. The memoir was meant to contain
his personal account of the Watergate crisis, the pardoning of
President Richard Nixon, and other connected events. The plaintiffs
in turn entered into a prepublication agreement with Time magazine,
under which the latter agreed to publish short excerpts from the
memoir in its magazine about a week before the memoir was to be
released publicly. Two or three weeks before the memoir was to be
released, the defendant’s editor received an unauthorized copy of the
361
final manuscript from an anonymous source. Knowing the material
to be highly confidential and time sensitive, but nonetheless sensing a
news opportunity, he hastily put together a news story of about 2250
words, excerpting various quotes, details, paraphrases, and facts from
362
the manuscript. When the defendant published its story, Time
magazine immediately cancelled its prepublication agreement with
the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs in turn commenced an action for
copyright infringement—together with other state law claims—
363
against the defendant.
Discussions of Harper & Row today invariably focus on the
Supreme Court’s opinion in the case and its conclusion that the
defendant’s use did not constitute a fair use, despite the journalistic
importance of the material and the allied First Amendment issues
360.
361.
362.
363.

GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL (1979).
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–43.
Id. at 543.
Id.
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364

involved. What is more relevant for our purposes is how the Court
reached the question of fair use, an affirmative defense, and for which
it would have had to reach a decision on the plaintiff’s prima facie
entitlement. And here we see an unusually rich discussion of
copyright’s basic architecture in the disagreement among the lower
courts, which the singular focus on the Supreme Court’s opinion
almost always ignores.
After setting out the facts of the case, the district court moved
365
almost immediately to the issue of fair use. Its discussion of the
prima facie entitlement was limited to the observation that the work
was “protected by copyright,” a proposition for which it cited the
definition of a literary work and the fact that the transfer from the
366
author to the publisher had been recorded. Moving to fair use, and
running through the various factors enumerated in the statute, the
district court then concluded that the defendant’s copying was not
367
privileged as a fair use and found for the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s
368
failure to analyze the prima facie entitlement altogether. Yet, its
opinion argued that the real focus of the dispute ought to have been
on whether the plaintiff’s work was fundamentally “copyrightable”
369
rather than on the defendant’s fair use. Its observation in this regard
is telling:
The trial court began its opinion on copyright infringement by
considering whether The Nation article was news reporting and, if
so, whether The Nation had made a “fair use” of the memoirs. As a
result, it did not face, at the outset, the threshold issue whether the
material used by the magazine was copyrightable. We commence
this part of our discussion, then, by turning our attention to that
question, putting aside the matter of “fair use” until we have
370
decided if any use of copyrighted expression did, in fact, occur.

Turning to the issue of copyrightability, the Second Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff’s work consisted of both protected and
364. See supra notes 358–359.
365. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069–70
(S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
366. Id. at 1069–70 & n.3.
367. Id. at 1070–72.
368. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
369. Id.
370. Id.
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371

unprotected expression. Using this finding as its basis, it concluded
that the defendant’s copying was of no more than three hundred
protected words from the plaintiff’s work, and it used this conclusion
372
in its own fair-use analysis. Thus, despite its avowed focus on
copyrightability, the Second Circuit engaged in what was effectively a
“filtration” exercise of eliminating unprotected material from the
373
analysis altogether, without using this to vary the entitlement.
It is ironic that the court—at this stage of the analysis at least—
seemed to be on the right track. In making the move from
copyrightability to fair use directly, though, it glossed over the
question of copying, which it merged with the fair-use analysis. Thus,
in its analysis of the second fair-use factor, the Second Circuit noted
how protection for the work was “narrow,” without hinting at the
374
consequence or manifestation of such narrow protection. Applying
the fair-use factors to the defendant’s “infinitesimal” copying, the
court concluded that the defendant had a valid fair-use claim in the
375
case.
Given that the two lower courts had oscillated between fair use
and copyrightability, one might have thought that the Supreme Court
would choose to steer a midway position and focus on the question of
“copying.” Instead, it dismissed the lower courts’ disagreement in
overly simplistic terms as being about “originality” and observed
early on that it did not need to “reach [those] issues” because the
defendant had “admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author’s
original language totaling between 300 and 400 words and
376
constituting some 13% of [the defendant’s] article.” In this cryptic
observation, the Court was conflating the questions of actual copying
and substantial similarity—and treating the defendant’s admission on
the former as going to the latter.
Nonetheless, as part of the third fair-use factor, the Court did
377
scrutinize the defendant’s copying.
There, in examining the
“amount and substantiality” of the work used by the defendant, the
Court concluded that even though the copying was of a very small

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

See id. at 203.
Id. at 206.
See id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
Id. at 564–65.
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fraction of the work, it related to material that constituted the “heart”
378
of the work—endowing it with qualitative significance. In so doing,
379
the Court was merely echoing the district court’s findings. What is
interesting here is that the Court completely sidestepped the Second
Circuit’s disagreement with the district court on this question—that is,
whether the “heart” of the work could include unoriginal, and thus
unprotected, materials. The Second Circuit had concluded that the
“heart” of the work—even when copied by the defendant—
380
comprised factual material that was unprotected. The Court, on the
other hand, completely ignored this discrepancy, thereby implicitly
endorsing the position that the “heart” or “essence” of the work,
during the analysis of copying, could consist of parts of the work
other than the most original or creative parts—parts that the author
considered the core, even if they were independently unprotectible.
As discussed earlier, this position is more tenable under the
substantial-similarity analysis owing to its sequenced, partition381
dependent structure; yet surprisingly, the Court adopted this
position as part of its fair-use analysis.
None of the three opinions, then, seem to have paid sufficient
attention to the various moving parts of the plaintiff’s prima facie
entitlement. The Second Circuit came closest, in describing the
plaintiff’s protection as “narrow”—but then conflated the issues of
copyrightability and copying. The district court unthinkingly moved
directly to fair use. And the Supreme Court seems to have assumed
the issue away in its analysis. Had substantial similarity been taken as
a core part of the prima facie entitlement, each of the courts would
have been forced to consider the issue of copying directly, regardless
of what outcome they might have reached. The next Section details
how this might have occurred.
B. Harper & Row Through Copyright’s Sequenced Mechanisms
Had the courts paid closer attention to delineating the plaintiff’s
prima facie entitlement, it is very likely that they would have had to
confront more directly the question of how much protection the
memoir was entitled to receive. In so doing, they would have also

378. Id. at 565.
379. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev’d, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
380. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208.
381. See supra Part II.
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eliminated much of the confusion that seems to have informed their
fair-use analyses, allowing for a more coherent decision. Applying the
substantial-similarity analysis would have allowed the courts to
separate their inquiries into three separate steps: (i) thickness; (ii)
similarity; and (iii) fair use.
1. Thickness. As the Court in Harper & Row noted, the
382
defendant conceded that it did in fact copy from the plaintiff’s work.
Consequently, the question of probative copying could have been
avoided. Yet the Court would have been called upon to determine the
thickness of copyright protection that the work would obtain. And for
this determination, it would have had to dissect—as opposed to
filter—the work into its constituent elements. We saw how the
Second Circuit attempted something similar—except that it went on
383
to whittle down the plaintiff’s entitlement to its protectible parts.
Instead, the Court might have simply examined how much of the
plaintiff’s work consisted of copyrightable expression, and how much
of it contained unprotectible material. From the Second Circuit’s own
analysis, it appears as though the work contained a significant amount
384
of unprotectible content —which, as noted earlier, would have
necessitated the court’s application of an intermediate standard of
scrutiny to the analysis of the defendant’s copying, or the approach of
385
a “more discerning ordinary observer.” Instead of eliminating the
unprotected materials from the analysis, the court would have simply
accorded them negligible importance in the overall analysis.
In so applying the thickness prong, the court might have thus
indirectly given effect to copyright’s utilitarian mandate of ensuring
that unoriginal, factual, or abstract content does not obtain
386
protection—and is instead to remain in the public domain. The Ford
memoir relied extensively on information and facts available in the
public domain, and the original contribution lay in the author’s own
387
personal reflections on these events. The work, in other words,
furthered copyright’s utilitarian mandate only partially and thus
would have been legitimately entitled to no more than an
intermediate level of protection.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548.
Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 206.
Id. at 205–06.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.C.1.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
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It is worth mentioning that the district court was likely alluding
to this approach when it referred to the “totality” of the work that
388
was protected by copyright law. On appeal, the Second Circuit
thought this was “erroneous,” because it would have accorded the
389
copyright holder a monopoly over unprotected materials. The
Second Circuit’s logic seemed plausible only because it was looking at
the issue of copyrightability and not at the defendant’s copying. Had
it rightly focused on the question of copying—and the thickness of
protection to which the work was entitled—the Second Circuit might
have seen the logic in the district court’s totality argument, which the
Supreme Court eventually accepted, but without sufficient reasoning.
2. Similarity. Having concluded that the work was entitled to an
intermediate level of protection and was copyrightable as a whole, the
analysis might have then moved to actually applying that “more
discerning” standard to examine what exactly the defendant had
390
copied and its quantitative and qualitative significance. Here, it
seems likely that the Second Circuit’s focus on the quantity of the
defendant’s appropriation would have been insufficient because the
similarity prong necessitates a holistic comparison of the works and
an examination of whether the appropriation was of the substance
and value of the protected work.
As noted earlier, substance and value are not always
synonymous with the most original or creative parts of the work, but
can instead derive from the parts of the work that are most heavily
391
infused with the author’s personality, judgment, or effort. Using the
similarity prong in this fashion would have allowed the court to deal
directly with the fact that the defendant had indeed copied the
“heart” of the plaintiff’s work, even though that “heart” was not
individually copyrightable, being factual in nature. The conflict
between the lower courts on the question of copyrightability—which
the Supreme Court simplistically referred to as one that revolved
around “originality”—might have been usefully resolved by
recognizing that variables independent of the standard utilitarian
ones can and do enter the equation during the similarity analysis, and

388. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev’d, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
389. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208.
390. See supra note 94.
391. See supra Part II.B.
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that this is far from giving the plaintiff a monopoly over otherwise
uncopyrightable material because the inquiry and protection at this
stage are entirely relational.
It is hard to know how exactly a court might have come out on
the similarity analysis, given its structure as a factual determination.
The Supreme Court is likely to have found for the plaintiffs under this
formulation too, given how heavily it weighed the material actually
copied. This is in contrast to the Second Circuit, which emphasized
the quantitative rather than the qualitative dimension—perhaps
erroneously. On balance, though, the similarity analysis is likely to
have come out in favor of the plaintiffs under the substantialsimilarity analysis, principally as a result of the defendant’s copying of
the “essence” of the memoir. The plaintiffs were thus likely to have
shown the existence of a prima facie entitlement, even if not a
particularly robust one.
3. Fair Use. Should the court have found the plaintiffs to have a
prima facie entitlement after all, then the defendant’s fair-use
argument does become central. Note that unlike the actual opinions
in the case, in the substantial-similarity analysis, a court would reach
the fair-use stage only after confirming that the plaintiff does indeed
have a valid exclusionary entitlement of some thickness, and that the
defendant’s copying is similar to the plaintiff’s work when seen
through the measure of thickness warranted by the work. Given what
the court is likely to have examined in the previous two steps, the fairuse analysis becomes significantly more streamlined, and it can
legitimately focus on the defendant’s side of things, rather than on
rehashing the plaintiff’s entitlement all over again.
The second fair-use factor—the “nature” of the protected
work—may be disregarded because its content was effectively
392
adjudicated during the thickness inquiry. Similarly, on the third fairuse factor—the “amount and substantiality” of the taking—the court
could now examine this to contextualize the defendant’s copying. It
would thus examine the amount taken as a proportion of the
393
defendant’s—and not the plaintiff’s—work. The Second Circuit
394
adopted precisely this approach.
For the Second Circuit’s

392. See supra Part III.D.
393. See supra Part III.C.
394. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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reformulation to have been meaningful, though, the analysis of the
significance of the appropriation needs to have already been
completed; this analysis had not been undertaken in Harper & Row.
The substantial-similarity analysis, on the other hand, does this under
its similarity prong, rendering the reformulation of the third factor
necessary in order to avoid a redundancy. This leaves us with the two
remaining fair-use factors—both of which the court might have used
to examine the defendant’s actions more closely in terms of its
motivations and effects.
Once again it is hard to predict what the outcome is likely to
have been, owing to the detail-rich nature of the dispute and the
multiple moving parts. At the very least, the Court might have
adopted a far more streamlined approach to fair use, focusing
exclusively on the defendant’s copying and conduct, and would have
weighed the defendant-side factors against each other, without having
to intersperse the analysis with details about the plaintiff’s
entitlement—something that served to create an added layer of
complexity and confusion in the Court’s actual opinion in Harper &
Row.
* * *
In summary then, it is not clear that a court would have
necessarily reached a different outcome in Harper & Row using the
two-step substantial-similarity analysis. It is, however, very likely that
a court would have been forced to pay closer attention to copyright’s
underlying analytical framework and separate the plaintiff’s prima
facie entitlement from the defendant’s actions in its analysis before
deciding the case. In so doing, the Court could have stayed clear of its
lofty rhetoric about copyright’s purposes or its structure as a
“marketable” “property” right—assertions that seemed to play no
395
role other than obfuscating the overall analysis.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and courts remain divided over the fundamental
questions of whether and to what extent copyright is a form of
property or whether it is instead an entitlement more closely aligned
with tort law. And yet, neither side has paid sufficient attention to the
precise analytical structure of the copyright entitlement to shed light
on these questions. Copyright law’s emphasis on copying remains a

395. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554, 558 (1985).
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rich and underappreciated source of normativity for the institution.
Specifically, the inquiry into the wrongfulness of such copying under
the rubric of substantial similarity affords courts the opportunity to
calibrate a plaintiff’s entitlement to the peculiarities of the work in
question, and then instantiate protection relationally by examining
the defendant’s conduct and its relationship to the plaintiff’s
entitlement. Beyond its obvious flexibility, its structure as a
conceptually sequenced mechanism also renders the entitlementdelineation process pluralistic, allowing it to incorporate both
utilitarian and rights-based considerations into the determination.
Discussions of copyright’s entitlement structure have come to
focus primarily on its statutory dimensions. Indeed, reform initiatives
396
in the area look primarily to Congress for instantiation. To the
extent that courts and the common-law process are thought to have a
role in the institution, they are relegated to the all-encompassing fairuse doctrine. All of these discussions ignore the fundamental role of
courts and the common-law method in shaping copyright’s prima
facie entitlement via the doctrine of substantial similarity, an idea
that—in principle, at least—applies to the vast majority of copyright
cases and, not surprisingly, finds no mention whatsoever in the
copyright statute.
Reformulating copyright’s substantial-similarity inquiry in the
manner argued for here would serve two immediate purposes. First, it
would solve much of the confusion associated with the idea of
substantial similarity that has in turn encouraged calls for its complete
annihilation. It would in the process reveal that there is indeed a
perfectly rational method in the ostensible madness of the idea, one
worth preserving and developing. Second, it would force courts to
engage more directly with copyright’s goals, purposes, and analytical
structure as equal partners in the copyright-law-making exercise—a
dynamic that sadly enough, seems to have been all but lost.

396. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 137, at 52.

